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Introduction  
Topic of this work is the explanation of collective behavior through its founding 
component, the behavior of the socially situated person. More specifically, I aim at 
developing methods and tools for this purpose, which are supposed to prove 
beneficial if applied to empirical, real world problems. 
    As it is clearly visible, the enterprize of explaining collective behavior is at the core 
of many, if not all, social sciences. Be it Sociology, Social Psychology, Economics or 
even Business Administration: all these have to deal with the causes and 
consequences of collective phenomena. Over the past centuries, a large body of 
approaches and concepts concerning this topic has evolved. However, there is a 
ubiquitous distinction, which is shared across scientific disciplines: It is the distinction 
between microscopic and macroscopic (or individualistic and collective) levels of 
explanation. So for instance, Durkheims´s (1973) social facts and his famous claim to 
explain social phenomena by social phenomena are a famous  example for the 
collectivist position, while Webers´s (1984) also classical claim for methodological 
individualism locates itself on the opposite side of the spectrum. Of course, for 
individualists there is the need to acknowledge the existence of macroscopic 
properties, which is most prominently (but not sufficiently, as the reader will see later) 
reflected in Colemans´s (1990) work on the micro-macro link (c.f. Opp 2007). 
    However, I will not attempt to examine the different positions or their philosophical 
foundations in very detail at this point. (There will be reference especially to the 
ontological and methodological aspects in the later chapters.) What I want to do is to 
provide the reader with information which sets my enterprize in a proper frame. In 
order to demonstrate the challenges which one has to face in this subject, I now start 
by presenting an exemplary case. 
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Scenario 
 
Consider the following situation which I adapted from Lazega (2001) and to which I 
will refer as blueprint - scenario in the later chapter on simulation of influence 
processes: 
 
Suppose there is a group of lawyers who are partners in a law firm. In regular 
intervals, these partners gather in a partnership meeting in order to decide about 
topics concerning the firm, for instance, the branch of business in which the firm 
should further expand. In the time between those meetings the partners 
communicate among each other, of course with a pattern aligned to their formal work 
demands and informal preferences. At times, they also communicate about the 
forthcoming meeting. During the course of their communication, the 
partners may possibly alter their views and opinions on the topic to be discussed, 
thereby changing the communication environment of their fellow partners. Eventually, 
this repeated process either converges to unanimous views on the mentioned topics 
or leads to entrenchment of factions in the forthcoming partnership meeting. 
 
This scenario is obviously close to everyday experience, and with changed actors 
and topics, one might consider it a prototypical case of the ubiquitous processes of 
communication and influence. Therefore it is quite appealing as a starting point for 
discussion of the problems and approaches of explaining collective behavior. Of 
course reality can (and often will) be more complicated, but nevertheless this 
scenario contains all generic complexities of the problem on a small scale.  
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Terminology  
 
In order to structure the problem, it should be helpful to introduce some basic notions, 
in line with the fundamental distinction of microscopic and macroscopic properties. A 
constructive terminology is provided by Bunge´s (1979) account on systemism. 
According to Bunge, a system is a set of interdependent components, nothing more 
and nothing less. It should be quite natural to identify the lawyers with the system´s 
components and their set of communications and opinion adjustments with the 
system´s structure of interdependence. Consequently, microscopic properties are 
those properties which belong to the systems components, the single lawyers. 
Macroscopic properties are furthermore those properties which belong to the system, 
i.e. the set of lawyers. (Of course it is possible to define macroscopic properties on 
some  subsystem, that means a set of lawyers, which contains not all lawyers, but 
certainly more than one.) These macroscopic properties are by definition (or as a first 
conception as we will se later) relational properties, such like distributions of opinions 
or communication - or power relations. As the reader will certainly know, Bunge´s 
definition of a system is only one taken from a huge array of possible approaches to 
social phenomena. However, as its application to our scenario shows, it is an 
approach which is simple and can easily be applied to everyday problems. A further 
advantage is that it can be quite straightforwardly be used to reformulate concurring 
approaches, as will be shown subsequently.  
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Macroscopic Approach  
 
A possible approach to explaining collective behavior is to restrict theorizing to the 
collective level, which means that only macroscopic properties are considered to be 
acceptable as explanatory factors. In our example, collective phenomena like for 
instance norms and culture would be such factors which could be used to explain the 
lawyers distribution of preferences. 
    A classical example is Parsons´ (1996) theory of structural functionalism with its 
famous AGIL paradigm. Here behavior of a social system is seen to be determined 
by functions the system is expected to fulfil in order to persist in the future. According 
to Parsons these functions are adaptation, goal-attainment, integration and latent 
pattern maintenance (AGIL). Without discussing this theory and its plausibility in too 
much detail, I want to point to the following fact: Since all relevant notions are defined 
on the collective, the flow of causality is confined to the system (i.e. macroscopic) 
level. 
    This restriction immediately results in the shortcoming that there is no way to 
explain how these macroscopic functions are related to the basic elements of a social 
system, the individual persons.  Ironically, the confinement of theorizing to the 
macroscopic level ruins the theory´s explicit systemic character, as it is defined by 
Bunge (1979). Of course it is possible to propose other system components than 
persons, such as the "cultural subsystem" or the "economic subsystem". Taken to the 
extreme, this trick results in Luhmann´s (1984) conception of an "autopoietic social 
system", which only parasites on individuals without containing them. It is my strong 
conviction that restriction to qualitative reasoning may tempt oneself to such improper 
reductions of complexity. As Esser (1996) notes, Parson´s and Luhmann´s 
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approaches are furthermore characterized best as terminological systems but as 
proper theories, which parallels our claim. 
 
Microscopic Approach 
 
Another approach is to base explanation of collective phenomena on assumptions 
about individual behavior. In our example this would mean that the lawyers 
distribution of preferences would be explained by individual characteristics like for 
instance utility functions or specific decision behavior. 
    As implied by these examples, rational choice theory can be considered a 
prominent microscopic approach. Its core is the assumption of maximization of 
subjective expected utility (SEU), which defines the concept of rational action of 
individuals. Rational choice theory is represented in two versions, either "hard" and 
microeconomics-oriented (c.f. Coleman 1991, Esser 1996, Diekmann / Preisendörfer 
1993) or "soft", psychologically oriented (c.f. Ajzen 2005, Opp 2005). But regardless 
of the version considered, the main focus in empirical application lies in instantiation 
of the SEU-hypothesis, this is the determination of individual utility functions or 
attitudes. From this point, individual decisions can be derived, and it is possible to 
statistically aggregate a global distribution from these individual results. 
    In principle, rational choice theory provides a rationale for integration of 
macroscopic explanatory factors, as it has been developed by McClelland (1967) and 
has prominently been advocated by Coleman (1991) and Esser (1996). This 
schematic of micro-macro-explanation operates the following way. A collective state 
at some time point is supposed to form a decision environment for the individual 
actors. During a time step the individual actors assess their situation and update their 
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decisions, whose aggregation can be considered the collective state at the next time 
point. 
    While this schematic appears convincing in principle, it is non-identified in a 
serious aspect. It makes no statements regarding how collective states are 
connected to individual decisions. Usually these connections are conceptualized as 
concrete and elementary  hypotheses, analogous to behavioral hypotheses on the 
particular micro- or macro level. In this case hypotheses connecting the macro- to the 
micro level are called bridge hypotheses, following Nagel´s (1961) account on 
nomological reduction of theories, while hypotheses connecting the micro- to the 
macro-level are called aggregation rule. This rationale is advocated by Esser (1996) 
and Opp (2005). The critical (and in my view widely ignored) point is, that it is more 
than complicated to propose elementary hypotheses which connect a compound of 
objects to a single one. Coleman himself recognized this problem and wrote of these 
hypotheses as such which "could follow as deductions from a theory." (Coleman 
1991, p.14) In his work, this theory was usually one of market mechanisms, which 
allows to determine some equilibrium point of the expected behavior of a set of 
market members. If one however lacks such a method of inference in a multi-agent 
situation, one may be tempted to mistake empirical instantiation of the SEU-
hypothesis for building properly working bridge hypotheses, especially if usually only 
survey data on mutually unconnected persons is available. The discussion of Kelle 
and Lüdemann (1995) and Lindenberg (1996) is a lucid example for this. Another 
problem that arises before the background of proposing bridge-hypotheses is 
whether bridge hypotheses can be considered causal. The reason is that it is not self-
evident how causal agency of a compound of objects refers to the causal agency of 
its elements. I will discuss this topic in detail in a later chapter on the philosophy of 
level transitory relations. I want to emphasize the most important result of above 
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discussion. Properties of a compound of objects (or individuals) can not 
straightforwardly be connected to properties of its components, least in form of an 
elementary hypothesis. The reason is that such a projection needs to take account of 
the structure of interaction of the components, and for this specialized methods of 
inference need to be employed.  
 
Structural Approach 
 
The present work attempts to develop methods for the problem of inference on 
collectives based on individual behavior. The critical point is, that the structure of 
interdependence of persons has to be considered in order to make such inferences 
successful. Such a structure could be for example a homogenous market structure 
(as is usually assumed in microeconomics) or it could be the communication network 
of the lawyers in our introductive scenario. 
    In contrast to the previously presented approaches, there exists no closed 
theoretic paradigm of some "structural systemism" in the social sciences. However, 
and maybe due to the importance of inference tools, there exists a large body of 
research on methods for examining structured systems. I will now provide the reader 
with a short review of the most important concepts and approaches. 
 
Coping with Complexity 
 
Systems which show a structure of nonlinear and inhomogeneous interdependencies 
which make it difficult to predict its behavior from its components are often called 
complex systems. Adopting this term, the social systems in consideration can 
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certainly be called complex. Important concepts linked to this notion are those of 
emergence and reduction. These deal with the nature and possible explanation of so 
called "novel properties", which are deemed to be characteristic for complex systems. 
Discussion of these terms is closely related to the previously mentioned task of 
inference of system behavior given structured interdependence of the system´s 
components. However, I will postpone detailed treatment to a later chapter on the 
philosophy of level transitory relations. There exist various methods which deal with 
the analysis of complex systems, which most often have their origin in the natural 
sciences. It should be noted that all approaches share a quantitative, resp. formal 
setup, which allows so to speak "automated" integration of exercised 
interdependencies. 
    The classical method of inference in systems is system theory, which is also called 
cybernetics (c.f. Bischof 1998 for an introduction for social scientists).  Here the 
system´s components are represented by so called operator functions which 
transform some input into output. These operator functions are usually modeled as 
difference or integral equations, which describe the transformation rate behavior of 
the system´s components relative to time. Inference is either accomplished by 
specialized analytical methods or numeric simulation (c.f. Bischof 1998). This method 
has proven very useful over the last decades, but for the case of large and complex 
systems its application is limited, since in this case modeling easily becomes 
confusing. 
    Other methods, which allow the description of systems with a large population of 
components have been developed in the field of statistical physics. These deal with 
the development of distributions of element properties over time, prominently using 
stochastic differential equations. In the social sciences, such models are successfully 
applied to predict the movement behavior of crowds (c.f. Helbing 1996), but because 
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they are much more strongly concerned with system size than structure of 
interdependence their success does not transfer to other fields. 
    At the time, one of the most active fields of research is on agent based modeling 
(c.f. Gilbert and Troitzsch 1999, Weiss 2000). This is a method for designing 
computer models, which simulate the interaction of (more or less) autonomous 
objects. Models which contain several software agents are called multi agent 
systems. The core concept of this method is that all functions a real world object can 
perform are bundled together to a software object by a specific programming 
technique, and that those software object is given maximum autonomy during 
program execution. The core advantage is that agent based modeling allows to keep 
the overview over the design of even huge and and heterogeneously structured 
models. 
    Of course, other promising ways to integrate the structured behavior of systems´ 
components are thinkable, as will be discussed in a later chapter on inference in 
microscopic models. At this point it is important to understand that theorizing in the 
domain of complex systems, as social systems are, is not only dependent on proper 
definition of concepts and consideration of empirical results. It is furthermore 
indispensable both to possess a method for integration of the systems components 
behavior and to put this method into the proper place of the theorizing endeavor. 
Social science theory has lacked recognition of this fact, which maybe supported its 
widespread drift towards informal accounts on complexity, which even have 
developed closed languages to disguise the emptiness of their statements. 
Luhmann´s (1984) work is the most drastic example for this.  
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Social Causality 
 
So far my comments have shown the importance of consideration of the system´s 
structure of interdependence for the task of explaining collective phenomena. Of 
course the mere ability to integrate a set of dependence relations, as it may be 
provided by formal or computational methods, does not imply anything about the 
nature of these relations. Determining the nature of interdependence of social 
behavior is a task, which goes beyond both mathematics and what is usually 
considered to be social science methodology. Before proceeding to questions about 
measurement and testing of theories, (both being procedures which flow from 
epistemology), it is essential to elaborate the non-testable general structure, the 
ontology of the theory to be employed. Referring to a title of one of the works of 
Bunge (1979), ontology deals with what one considers to be the "furniture of the 
world", those concepts that are the objects of theorizing. Actually acknowledging the 
necessity to consider the nature of social interdependence appears to be a major 
accomplishment in contemporary sociology, as can be interpreted from the popularity 
of  Esser´s (1996) and Hedström´s (c.f. Hedström 2005) apology of "social 
mechanisms" as opposed to some "sociology of variables", which originates in 
Hedström´s (. However, this is not enough. Most importantly, a fundamental decision 
has to be made whether social interdependence (as elementary building block of any 
social mechanism) can be interpreted as being causal or not. Exponents of rational 
choice theory may of course argue that purposiveness is the constituent element of 
human action as opposed to mere behavior. Without drifting off into a discussion on 
freedom of will, I want to emphasize that autonomy and goal directedness of a 
system does not necessarily conflict with its causal reconstruction. (This topic will be 
discussed in detail in the chapter on philosophy of level transitory relations.) Deciding 
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for a causal account on social interdependence has an immediate important 
consequence, namely that analysis of a social system can proceed in terms of 
intervention, that is effects. Other consequences concern the methods which are 
employed for integrating a structure of interdependencies, but I will not elaborate on 
this point. As consequence of adopting a causal interpretation of social 
interdependence it is necessary to determine the actual position of the causal flow to 
be assumed. This point is crucial for the models realism and its applicability. 
Paralleling the claim of importance of purposive action, I will propose decision making 
(or more general, information processing) in a social environment to be the locus of 
causal flow in social systems. Recurring to the exemplary scenario of the lawfirm, 
causality is supposed to flow through individual processing of communicated 
information. In later chapters on measurement of cognitions of social influence and 
simulation of influence processes I will elaborate this point more deeply, in order to 
provide it with an appropriate treatment. In fact, with determination of the nature of 
social dependencies and an appropriate method for inference in an dependence 
structure, one has arrived at a position which seems a promising starting point for an 
actual modeling enterprize.  
 
Successful modeling and feasible applications 
 
The result from all above discussion is, that explanation of collective behavior is an 
endeavor which demands a large array of considerations to be made. Spanning from 
ontology and epistemology over social theory and mathematics to statistical 
measurement and testing, the complete spectrum of analytical social science is 
touched. This leads to the result that generalizable methods do not automatically 
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follow once a certain aspect or an inference tool like agent-based modeling is 
mastered. In my opinion, it is essential to recognize that building successful models is 
not only a technical exercise, which can be dealt with according to some elaborate 
paradigm. I hope that such a successful paradigm may be available in future, but at 
present work in this area is still strongly demanding a scholars artistic abilities. 
Although I claim the important role of creativity for the process of modeling and 
theorizing, this does not mean that results are only subject to aesthetic judgement. 
On the contrary, the importance of immediate and mediate results in this field must 
not be underestimated. The immediate advances might be of most practical value.  In 
the field of group research it becomes possible to derive group behavior from 
knowledge on individual attributes, which is of tremendous value for predicting and 
planning the effects of interventions. Returning to the initial example of the lawfirm, 
one could use such a model in order to understand the communication process 
among the lawyers. This knowledge could then be used to intervene into this process 
in order to yield desired group outcomes. Seen from a more abstract level, a 
successful modeling methodology adds value to structural analysis, as it is 
exemplified by social network analysis, by integrating the aspects of dynamics, 
systemicity and causality. In my view this might well lead to substantial theoretical 
progress since these fundamental aspects of social life are often ignored in social 
theory, which is generally not aligned with methodical progress.  
 
Outline of the work 
 
This dissertation aims at providing an integrated account on modeling collective 
behavior, dealing with a wide array of topics as it is discussed above. These topics 
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arch from ontology over modeling methodology and simulation modeling to 
measurement.  Taking advantage of the liberties associated with the format of a 
cumulative dissertation it focuses on several central aspects of the task. Before 
presenting the exact topics of the individual chapters, 
I will briefly explain the idea behind their structure. 
    As it has been discussed, the task of implementing models which can be used to 
actually explain collective behavior by processes on the individual level necessitates 
considerations on the ontology of level transitory relations.  In a next step, it must be 
determined how such an ontological account can be turned into a methodology so 
that it can fruitfully be applied for research on real world problems. A further step 
towards practical application is the actual implementation of a model of collective 
behavior, together with the development of measurement instruments which allow its 
instantiation based on observed data. 
    The first chapter ("Interlevel relations and manipulative causality") deals with a 
philosophical approach to formulation of level-transitory relations. By this is meant if 
statements that connect the collective and individual levels can meaningfully be 
declared. As implied by the above discussion on the pitfalls of social theory and 
social causation, the nature (or better the adequacy) of level transitory relations is not 
easily determined. A core problem is that the individual levels appear to behave 
according to their own "logic" and that the causal character of inter-level relations 
seems unclear. While people generally assume some dependence between 
individual and collective states, there is both discussion why macroscopic entities 
could be considered as causal agents on their own, and where "unintended 
consequences of action" on the collective level could stem from. 
    My approach starts at the conception of a layered architecture of the world, which 
is clearly an ontological one. While ontology is often shunned in popperian science 
 16
as being platonistic, this is clearly not the case. Even the notion of a cumulative 
growth of knowledge relies on some conception of reality, like the shape of a bolt is 
implied in the shape of a monkeywrench. This however does not imply that some 
conception of reality necessarily needs to be considered real itself. For this a 
nominalistic framework can of course be followed. 
    The basic argument on the identifiability of a level is concerned with the 
determination of identity of objects located on this specific level. Summarized, I claim 
that objects can be isolated from their environment by the set of causal mechanisms 
associated to them. So to speak, mechanism and object are being seen as being two 
sides of the same coin. A both crucial and problematic notion in this respect is the 
notion of causality, since it has a close relationship to the notion of action, which is 
made clear in the term of manipulative causality. This relation between object and 
agency makes it difficult to separate "reality" and "observer", to employ these well 
known terms. On the other hand, manipulative causality allows the recognition of 
multiple levels in a hierarchic structured world. This is the case, since manipulation is 
thinkable both on elementary objects and higher level objects which form an 
autonomous joint of lower level entities. To be more precise, autonomous structure is 
a prerequisite of higher level manipulation, since it forms higher level interfaces, viz. 
mechanisms. 
    Departing from these ontological assumptions, the first chapter discusses the 
relation of higher- and lower level causation and the ontological character of level 
transitory statements (whose importance has been stressed at the beginning of this 
introduction.) Further points of discussion are the concepts of reduction and 
emergence, together with methodological accounts on this subject. These are most 
importantly materialistic monism (or ontological reductionism), nomological 
reductionism and physical realizationism. 
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    The second chapter ("Probabilistic inference for actor centered models") is build on 
the results of the first chapter. Its premier objective is to develop the already made 
philosophical advances into a productive modeling methodology. Therefore it 
discusses the representation of object identity as it is accomplished by different 
modeling frameworks, such as multi-agent-modeling, systems-theory and 
probabilistic graphical models. As it turns out, every modeling framework represents 
object identity in a certain way and furthermore allows to synthesize system behavior 
via a generic mode of inference. However, the individual frameworks differ in their 
focus on these two aspects. During the course of the chapter, special emphasis is 
given to the framework of probabilistic graphical models, which are interpreted in 
accordance to the already made philosophical considerations. In order to test the 
proposed methodology for representing systems and deriving level transitory 
statements, an exemplary application of probabilistic graphical modeling is 
presented. This example deals with interaction behavior in a dynamic context. The 
third chapter ("Simple Heuristics in Complex Networks") shifts the focus completely 
from methodology towards application. The central topic is the design and analysis of 
a simulation model of influence processes regarding opinion formation in social 
networks. Relating to the earlier discussion, such a model is important for the 
following reasons. First, as a simulation model, it allows for inferring collective level 
inferences from individual level assumptions. Second, as its representation of 
interdependencies between the elementary entities is based on the concept of social 
networks, it provides a very general and flexible framework for application. Third, with 
the concept of social influence, it proposes a general nexus for social causality on the 
individual level. Taken together, a model with these features can be considered a 
general framework for a wide class of models of social behavior and thus be very 
productive for development of theory. Of course the model also deals with more 
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specific problems. When combined with social networks, the concept of social 
influence quite naturally provides a nexus for social causality. However, it does not 
immediately determine how the transfer of social causality is accomplished. This has 
been specified by using a cognitive approach to social influence. Here social 
influence is not seen as a kind of exerted force which is channeled through social 
relations, but as information which is processed by the receiving agent instead. A 
cognitive approach on social influence has the advantage that it precisely and 
plausibly defines an agent´s causal interface as compared to traditional relational 
model of power. Of course this does not mean that a relational model of power in 
which potential influence is based on resource control becomes useless. However, 
from the viewpoint of  microscopic modeling a cognitive model is much more easily to 
handle since through its agent centered causal assumptions system level inference is 
facilitated. Aligned with recent developments in cognitive psychology (c.f. , social 
influence is modeled as a decision process based on social cues. More precisely, 
under the label of "fast and frugal heuristics" the simulation model considers several 
models of agent cognition with varying degree of cognitive effort required. Besides 
examining the effects of agent cognition, the simulation also considers the effects of 
clustering of the assumed communication network. This is important, since formation 
of cohesive subgroups may lead to situations in which minority positions can persist 
because cluster members shield each other against external influences. Based on 
these rather general setup of the simulation study, an array of interesting results 
concerning the behavior of social collectives is derived in the chapter. Furthermore, a 
case study based on empirical data from a New England lawfirm is presented. The 
fourth chapter ("Evaluating Social Influence Relations: an Item-Response-Modeling 
Approach") refers to operationalization of the cognitive model of social influence, 
which forms the central causal building block of the network model presented in the 
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previous chapter. If this former model is about to be calibrated to real world data, 
appropriate measurements have to be obtained. Therefore this chapter´s aim is the 
development of scales for measuring perceptions of alter´s persuasiveness, authority 
and propensity towards coercive behavior. In order to fulfil this task questionnaires 
together with item-response-theory scales are developed in a survey setting. 
Furthermore these instruments are applied in a closed network setting in order to 
check their validity. The respective data deals with a group of scientists at two 
German universities and has been collected via an online survey. By combining 
these four chapters I want to present a coherent and stimulating work, which 
engages several topics that are important for the task of micro-macro-modeling in the 
social sciences. I hope that my effort had some success and provides the reader with 
a stimulating treatment of the subject. 
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Chapter 1: Interlevel Relations and Manipulative Causality 
 
SUMMARY. Interlevel Relations and Manipulative Causality. The topic of this article 
is the analysis of the relations between different levels of reality. The core argument 
is based on considerations of both an epistemology of action and manipulative 
causality as a criterion of object identity. The argumentation is extended towards the 
concepts of self-organization and self-regulation. Finally, several views on reduction 
and the problems of emergence and complexity are discussed. 
 
Key words: interlevel relations, causality, action, epistemology, reduction, 
emergence, self-organization, self-regulation, complexity 
 
Introduction 
 
The conception of a layered architecture of the world has become a commonplace in 
today“s science. Its central difficulty, namely the question of the relation between the 
respective levels of existence, has gained significant interest. This is especially the 
case in scientific areas where reference to neighboring levels seem to promise 
significant new answers. One example is individualistic social science, my own field 
of research: Besides classical methodological considerations (compare McClelland 
1967 and Coleman 1990) there is growing interest both in computational methods 
(compare Conte et al. 1997 and Gilbert/Troitzsch 1999) and results from Philosophy 
of Mind (compare Heintz 2004 and Sawyer 2002, 2003). 
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In accordance with these developments and due to its methodological importance, 
the question of interlevel relations will be the topic of this article. The discussion 
relates mainly to recent philosophical developments, namely advances in Philosophy 
of the Mind and in the study of causation. A central epistemological aspect for 
consideration is the connection between knowledge and action. Manipulative 
causality will be a key concept of my argumentation: I will be showing its contribution 
to the definition of objects and consequently levels. Furthermore I will be examining 
the effects of causality as a criterion of identity of objects on the analysis of interlevel 
relations. This leads to discussion of the concepts of reduction and emergence. 
 
The provision of a coherent answer to the question of interlevel relations comes, 
unsurprisingly, at certain cost. This cost is the introduction of a constructive criterion 
of object identity via the concept of action. However, I support the viewpoint that 
observer-dependant knowledge is by no means arbitrary. 
 
Object Identity and Structural Causality 
 
Instead of enquiring the nature of interlevel relations directly, I will start by examining 
its constituents. Apparently these constituents are the objects found on the 
respective levels. Consequently, ignorance of interlevel relations leads to hierarchical 
properties of objects (such as „being emergent“, „being reducible“ or the like) 
becoming uninteresting. Nevertheless, what remains interesting in this case is the 
question regarding what properties or forces isolate these objects from their 
environment. 
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Structural Causality 
If we want to analyze the relation between objects on different levels, we have to 
determine how an object can be identified as such. This necessary identification can 
be guaranteed by employment of the notion of mechanism, designating a stable and 
genetic relationship between properties. Determination of the set of mechanisms 
attached to an objects properties allows the isolation of it from its environment. This 
concept has been developed by Pearl (Pearl 2000) within the framework of his 
structural theory of causality. Within this theory local mechanisms are encoded by the 
set of edges of a directed acyclic graph which represents the composition of the 
system of interest1 2. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Illustration of a directed acyclic graph. (Arrows represent local causal mechanisms, circles represent 
properties.) 
 
 
                                               
1
 The notion of „directed acyclic graph“ is a central concept of the theory of Bayesian Networks, respectively 
Probabilistic Graphical Models, which provides the base calculus of the theory of structural causality. A fact of 
technical importance is that indirect probabilistic relationships are deleted out of a Bayesian network by 
application of the so-called criterion of markov-parentship. This criterion checks for conditional statistical 
independence in directed acyclic graphs. In any case, reasonably detailed introduction to this theory would go 
beyond the scope of this article. The reader is referred to (Baldi/Brunak 2001), (Jensen 2001) and (Pearl 1988, 
2000).} 
2
 A further point to note is the fact that although Pearl“s theory employs probabilistic methods, it contains a 
deterministic ontology. However, I will not make any concrete statements regarding the ontological part of this 
question and view probability as an epistemic concept. 
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Manipulative Action 
The reader may well have noticed the catch that is inherent to this approach to object 
identity. Now we are able to isolate an object by its boundary of mechanisms, but the 
problem has only shifted towards the following question: How do we determine the 
existence of such a mechanism? 
 
As is known, this question is associated with two fundamental aspects: the first is the 
problem of the identification of causality while the second is the problem of induction 
of lawful relations from experience3. First of all, I will follow the argumentation of 
scholars who view causation in close connection to manipulation. Manipulative action 
is necessary for the observer in order to isolate the mechanism of interest and to 
identify its conditions and consequences. Reasons for this is the necessity of 
elimination of background noise and identification of the mechanism“s genetic 
principle (compare Bischof 1998 and von Wright 1991). Furthermore, it is important to 
notice that the concept of manipulative causality is centered around the idea of an 
actor, with all the virtual limitations on his knowledge, decisions and actions. One 
consequence is its relative conservativeness with regard to the ontology of causation. 
Its integral concept of structural causality does not enforce different logical treatments 
of type and event causation (compare Kim 1993). Both facets of causality 
differ only with regard to the actors subjective scenario of information, namely what is 
known of a specific mechanism´s triggering- and side conditions (Pearl 2000 p.310). 
Rationality 
As mentioned before, the second aspect of the problem of identification of 
mechanisms is the problem of induction. It can be bypassed with certain elegance as 
                                               
3
 The problem of induction may be regarded as a sub-problem with respect to the identification of causality. 
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long one does not expect too much. Of course I will not argue against Falsificationism 
in its non-relativist facets (Popper 1994 and Lakatos in Lakatos/Musgrave 1970). 
 
Although there can be no certainty regarding the correspondence of proposition and 
reality, there is of course the need for both decision and action. Shifting the focus of 
the problem of induction from truth towards rationality provides a viable solution: Now 
the question changes from „What is the correct relationship“ to „What is the best 
relation to propose, given the knowledge at hand?“. Since it includes its conditions, 
the second question can in principle always be answered. The tools for solving the 
problem of induction in its minor and pragmatic form have been delivered by the 
bayesian approach to probability theory (Jaynes 1974). Its constitutional Cox-Jaynes 
axioms reformulate probability theory as inductive logic 4. 
Constructivity 
It is important to note, that the problem of rationality can be viewed as the problem of 
induction, stripped of its connection to reality. This connection has to be established 
by other means, if one needs to arrive at adequate decisions. It can be provided by 
the concept of manipulative action which calls for experimentation as the basis of 
generation of knowledge, as introduced above. 
 
The consequence of this argumentation is the establishment of an epistemology of 
action. Here the generation of knowledge can be viewed as a partially active process, 
depending on both action and experience. (compare Piaget 1981 and von Wright 
1991). The (probably unavoidable) cost of the employment of action as my central 
                                               
4
 In contrast to traditional opinion Bayesianism does not view probability  theory as a means of rationalizing on 
the occurrence of events. Here probability is perceived as a logical value attached to propositions. One could say 
that classical interpretation of probability reasons a direct reality, while Bayesian interpretation focuses on 
knowledge, respectively belief. The question of correspondence does not necessarily enter into the semantics of 
the calculation. 
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concept is the infiltration of constructivity into the argumentation. This constructivity 
stems from the fact that what can be known is subject to the boundaries of action. 
Consequently, knowledge depends both on what one has done, is able to do, and, 
more fundamentally, can imagine doing. An important factor when considering these 
boundaries is the evolutionary development of human cognition (compare Vollmer 
1981). 
 
Let me complete this section with a short summary of the epistemological approach. 
In brief, I argue that a prerequisite of an analysis of interlevel relations is the analysis 
of object identity. In conclusion, objects can be identified via their boundary of 
associated mechanisms, which in turn can be identified by manipulative action, as 
considerations of the problems of causality and induction, respectively rationality 
show. The cost of employing of the concept of action is the introduction of a 
constructive element to the argumentation. 
 
Object and Level 
A further topic that is worthwhile to considering in the discussion of interlevel relations 
is the relationship between the notions of object and level. An elaborate concept of 
level is provided by Bunge (Bunge 1979, p.13). According to this view, levels are 
assumed to be relational concepts, whereby, roughly speaking, objects on a higher 
level are composed of objects on a lower level. As Bunge states, this approach to the 
definition of levels is purely conceptual and thus inert with respect to his proposed 
ontology. The critical point is, that levels are defined by a relation between objects, 
but the objects on the respective levels remain unidentified. 
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The conservativeness of the above mentioned definition lies in the fact that it avoids 
reliance on some mystical concept, like for instance entelechy, which could identify 
higher level objects in relation to lower level ones. Nevertheless, a notion of level 
which is inert with regard to the remaining concepts of a proposed ontology seems 
unsatisfactory. 
 
Causal Affiliation 
To provide a satisfactory account, the level needs to be defined with respect to its 
constituting objects. In accordance with the idea of structural causality, as introduced 
above, I will define level as follows: A level is the set of all objects which can interact 
causally with a specific object (which forms the levels reference point), including this 
object. A specific hierarchy of levels may be determined by the possibility of 
aggregation of mechanisms. 
 
As the declaration of mechanisms ultimately depends on considerations of 
manipulative action, the declaration of a joint, respectively higher order mechanism 
depends on the intelligibility of joint, respectively higher order manipulation. One 
should note that it is a result of these considerations that the declaration of a specific 
level depends on both the reference object and the manipulations in focus. It is, so to 
speak, important „where to position the lever“. 
 
Autonomy 
Certainly the choice of levels is not arbitrary. Reality determines how successfully 
joint mechanisms can be declared. The varying fit of descriptions of different 
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granularity is often attributed to the existence of emergent properties5. Again, there 
exists a relational definition by Bunge (Bunge 1979 pp. 27), which states that 
emergent properties are properties which a system acquires during its process of 
assembly. In coherence to his previously mentioned definition of level, this definition 
lacks a statement of how these properties are constituted throughout the hierarchy. 
Again, this definition is proper, but nevertheless unsatisfactory. 
 
Within a epistemology of action, a criterion of constitution is ease with which a higher 
level mechanism can be declared. The significance of this criterion stems from the 
fact that the declaration of a mechanism is dependant on the intelligibility or actual 
accomplishment of action. 
 
I wish to remark, that it seems to be exactly this aspect of subjective ease which 
gives a concepts like entelechy its luring charms as constituting criterion of levels. 
However, there is the possibility of causal description of processes which seem to 
encourage teleological description at first glance (compare Stegmueller 1983). Thus, 
an easy aggregate description may be accomplished by means other than entelechy, 
but with similar results. Obviously, if a set of mechanisms has a structure which 
results in relative environmental autonomy, an aggregate description can easily be 
declared. Autonomous structures of mechanisms are known under the labels of self-
regulating and self-organizing. Self-regulation is the case if a 
certain structure compensates for outside disturbances (Bischof 1998), while self-
organization describes the tendency of certain structures to reach steady-states of 
relative environmental autonomy (Bertalanffy 1998). In accordance with these 
                                               
5
 In a structural framework (emergent) „properties“ can be considered equivalent with (emergent) 
„mechanisms“, because the latter contain the former, and the former owe their significance to latter. 
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concepts, higher level properties could be identified with functions of the auto-
functional subsets of the state space6 unfolded by the component entities of the 
structure. 
 
The significance of the concept of autonomy lies in the fact that it allows for intuitive 
identification of levels (and thus hierarchy) via its constituting autonomous objects. It 
is important to notice that it is only a secondary criterion of object identity, since it is 
defined on the notions of mechanism and thus action. Again, the result is rather an 
epistemological concept than an ontological one. 
 
Logical Realization 
Autonomous structures are per definition joints of mechanisms. Their aggregate 
descriptions can be generally considered many-to-one projections of the elementary 
level, since otherwise talk of autonomy would make no sense. In accordance with this 
bottom-up process of declaration of objects one could say that activity on the lower 
level of declaration logically realizes activity on the respective higher level.  
 
However, within the framework of the proposed approach the relationship between 
levels is a conceptual one, as objects within a specific level are already completely 
determined by their defining mechanisms. This proposition is a result of the bottom-
up approach to levels and seems to be the core argument of ontological reductionism 
(compare Schlick 1993). An ontologically contrary position needs to break this 
relation of constitution. 
 
                                               
6
 According to my knowledge, this would be designated as an attractor-structure within the framework of 
dynamical systems. 
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The above considerations are closely related to the notion of supervenience. 
According to Kim (Kim 1998) in a layered model of the world supervenience can be 
defined via the notion of microindiscernibility: „For any x and y, belonging to level L..., 
if x and y are indiscernible in relation to properties at all levels lower than L..., then x 
and y are indiscernible with respect to all properties at level L.“ (Kim1998 p.17) 
Consequently, properties on level L supervene on properties on the lower levels. 
Regarding this definition to my own approach, higher level objects (as containers of 
properties) are apparently supervenient on the lower level objects. However, as Kim 
states, supervenience is a phenomenological theory which makes statements about 
„patterns of property covariance“ and not about „deeper dependence relations“ (Kim 
1998 p.15). 
 
Logical realization exceeds the relation of supervenience by the claim of its definitory 
necessity once a higher level object is identified. Admittedly, „realization“ is somehow 
misleading since within an epistemology of action the same status of reality is 
assumed on every level. It necessarily depends on experimentation. 
 
Regardless of the proposed equivalence of higher level mechanisms with certain sets 
of lower level ones, the concept of level maintains its significance. Given that a 
hierarchy of several mechanisms has been declared, it is (among other things) a 
matter of choice which one will be triggered. As implied in the section on causal 
affiliation, action provides matter for the concept of level. 
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Reduction 
There are two eminent concepts of interlevel relations, which have merely been 
touched upon in the above discussion, namely reduction and its counterpart, 
emergence. 
 
Ontological Reductionism 
The idea of reduction comes, so to speak, in two major shapes. The first could be 
called ontological reductionism (compare Smart 1987) and seems to be broad 
common sense in the sciences. It states that, if an object is composed out of smaller 
particles, these smaller particles obviously share a material reality, which is not 
owned by higher level objects. Consequently, the smallest particles make up for the 
substrate of the universe of which the higher level objects are only configurations. 
 
I have two objections regarding this view: Firstly, it is merely a procedure to 
decrement the level, the character of reality of which is questioned. Secondly, one 
can never determine if the lowest level has been found, since the possibility of an 
unknown lower level can never be refuted as long as there is a single question left 
unanswered. However, it contains a very serious aspect, namely that the possibility 
of decomposition of an object allows for its description solely by its constituting 
components. 
 
My opinion towards ontological the problems of reductionism is that it lacks an 
epistemological criterion for the assertion of status of reality. There is simply no tool 
available to stop the mentioned process of decrementation. 
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Nomological Reductionism 
 
The second form of the idea of reduction is what could be called nomological 
reductionism and has been advocated by Nagel (Nagel 1961). Here the core idea is 
embodied in the attempt to convert one theory into another by employment of so-
called bridge hypotheses. The reduction of theories belonging to different levels of 
existence is seen as only a special case of this general scheme. Several arguments 
have been advocated against nomological reductionism, the most prominent being 
the multiple realization argument (Fodor 1976; Putnam 1975). It states, that a proper 
bridge law might never be established because of the presumably huge and 
unsystematic array of microscopic realizers of higher level properties7. 
 
I wish to formulate another argument against nomological-reductionism. A weakness 
of this approach is that it operates within a universe of statements without explicit 
reference to a model-ontology, respectively semantics. As it turns out, the 
nomological reduction of theories which describe objects between which the 
composition-relation holds, violates the the respective definitions of identity of the 
objects. This leads to contradictions regarding the concepts of object and level, which 
can be regarded as semantic terms with respect to terms describing the actual 
instances in focus. 
 
Since an object can be defined by its generic mechanisms and levels can 
consequently be defined by causal affiliation, the invocation of a bridge hypothesis 
would have two consequences: First, the notion of level would become paradoxical, 
                                               
7
 This concept does not question the approach advocated here, as logical realization explicitly proposes a many-
to-one map onto the higher level, and is furthermore only applicable where the decomposition of a higher level is 
known. This would be the case for processes of self-organization and -regulation. A further critical point is the 
availability of an appropriate structure calculus, as introduced below. 
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since the particular bridge mechanisms effecting object would become a higher- and 
lower level entity at the same time. Result is the violation of the respective objects 
criteria of identity. Secondly, it would result in causal overdetermination, since an 
object on a specific level is already defined by its set of generic mechanisms which 
would be exceeded by the declaration of an additional bridge mechanism. 
 
Physical Realizationism 
 
Apparently, nomological reductionism seems fairly inappropriate for treatment of the 
question of interlevel relations. Another reductionistic approach has been proposed 
within the framework of the mind-body problem (which is often considered as a 
subproblem with regard to interlevel relations). This is so-called physical 
realizationism (Kim 1998). It is in some respect similar to the approach advocated 
here, insofar as it identifies the higher (mental) level entities by reference to their 
causal (functional) roles. Nevertheless, the (physical) lower level entities, which 
realize the higher level ones, are identified by their material reality. As argued for the 
case of ontological reductionism this only makes sense if material reality does not 
fade during an infinite amount of level transitions. 
 
Emergence 
At this point I will briefly mention the concept of emergence which forms the 
counterpart of reduction. It is usually characterized by the proposal that 
decomposable objects on a certain level show novel properties which cannot be 
„reduced“ to their components. Usually it is unclear within the framework whether 
„reduction“ means „explanation“ or is understood in an ontologically stronger sense. If 
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the latter is the case one faces the following problem. If there is no criterion for the 
assertion of reality (as is represented in epistemology of action), emergent properties 
can only be declared per fiat. Thus, ontological emergence is practically a 
transcendental statement. 
 
An alternative is the statement of weak emergence which claims both the existence 
of higher level properties and the possibility of backtracking these to a lower level. 
Both physical realizationism (as a mind-body theory) and the claim of identification of 
higher level mechanisms with auto-functionality of autonomous structures, as 
introduced above, are both statements of weak emergence. 
 
Both share criteria for the assertion of reality, the first by the intuitive identification of 
matter and function, and the second by the introduction of the epistemology of action. 
 
 
Structure Calculuses and Complexity 
 
The emergence of new properties is often said to be a feature of complex systems. If 
emergence is both understood as an epistemological concept and related to self-
organization and -regulation, then this is true in some sense. A certain behavioral 
plasticity, and thus an accordingly complex composition, is a necessary prerequisite 
for an object in order to show these characteristics (compare Stegmueller 1983). 
Certainly this does not mean that complexity should be considered as a realm of 
strong concepts of emergence. Even hidden in a maze of mechanisms, a per fiat 
statement remains a per fiat statement. What is needed in order to cope with 
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complexity (e.g. thedifficult decomposability of objects with respect to their 
mechanisms8) are methods of system synthesis. These provide the means for the 
declaration of joint mechanisms. I will call such methods which allow for 
computational treatment of systems synthesis „structure calculuses“. 
 
A classic example is the methods of control-theory, which allow the inference of the 
behavior of the system from the behavior of its components. Probabilistic Graphical 
Models, respectively Bayesian Networks, are a more modern approach. Today these 
are mainly employed in artificial intelligence, bioinformatics and epidemiology. As 
mentioned, the characteristic of this method is the decomposition of a joint probability 
distribution describing the behavior of global systems into a graph of local conditional 
distributions (compare Jensen 2001, Muehlenbein 2002 and Pearl 1988, 2000). The 
method easily integrates with empirical data, but application is limited by the size of 
the system in focus. 
 
Conclusion 
 
By declaring of an action-centered approach to epistemology I have tried to provide a 
basis for clarifying the concept of interlevel relations. This approach is insofar 
important as a critical discussion of the concept emergence with respect to observer-
dependency has been long overdue. A further point worthwhile mentioning is that 
tools for coping with complexity 
                                               
8
 It should be noted that the notion of complexity advocated here is ontologically stronger than the well known 
concept of computational complexity. It presumes representation of the mechanistic structure of the system, 
exceeding questions on prediction of data or procession of throughput. 
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exist, thus allowing assertions on specific processes of weak emergence to be made. 
I hope that I have presented a well founded, comprehensible and fruitful essay. 
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Chapter two: Probabilistic Inference for Actor-Centered 
Models 
 
Abstract 
 
The analysis of relations between different levels of a system is a key issue in social 
science simulation. Here, I discuss the contribution of different modeling 
methodologies to this. Special emphasis is given to the formalism of “Probabilistic 
Graphical Models“, resp. “Bayesian Networks“, which is both advantageous for level 
transitory inference and integration of empirical data. Furthermore, issues of 
practicability and area of application are considered. The argumentation is 
exemplified by demonstration of a toy-application for which explicit level-transitory 
statements are inferred. 
 
KEYWORDS: micro-macro-gap, agent based modeling, level transition, probability 
theory, graphical modeling, bayesian networks, complex systems 
 
Were are we now? - Modeling across Levels 
During the past years, Agent Based Modeling (compare Brassel et al. (1997) and 
Weiss (2000) ) has become the key methodology in the field of social simulation. It’s 
success has been far reaching; My colleagues who do not engage in computational 
methods tend to use the words Agent Based Modeling (ABM) and social simulation 
synonymously. 
 
 43
In this paper, I will be in tie with at least some of the reasons for this tremendous 
success. I usually do not forewarn the reader, but I will not discuss ABM’s 
possibilities of informal, qualitative modeling. Rather, I will focus on examining how 
models can be set up, which show emergent global behavior that is not coded in their 
local components. 
 
Multi Agent Systems (MAS) certainly do belong to this class of models. However, the 
modeler`s toolbox can be stocked up with a method, which allows for more explicit 
theorizing in the micro-macro gap’s domain. With the theory of Probabilistic Graphical 
Models (compare Baldi and Brunak (2001), Lauritzen (1996) and Pearl (1988), (2000) 
), I will introduce formal calculus which may be employed to analyze the relation 
between the component- and system levels of conception. A more extensive account 
on the metatheoretical aspects of this approach can be found at Schwenk (2004b). 
 
It should be noted, that acquaintance with the essential concepts of probabilistic 
micro-macro-modeling may be of considerable benefit for analysis of Multi Agent 
Systems, even if it’s formal apparatus is not employed. 
 
The System´s Elements  
As stated, the task is to find a formulation for the relation of levels of a given system. 
Now the first step to take is to define notions which allow to tackle the problem 
effectively. I have chosen the concept of identity of objects to be the basis of my 
argumentation. Instead of directly asking for the nature of emergent properties, I start 
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by examining how an object is isolated from its environment and thus is identified 9 as 
such. 
Isolation by Causation 
 
Interestingly, but maybe not surprisingly, structural isolation is the core idea of 
Object-Oriented and Agent Based Modeling. (I will touch ABM’s key aspect of 
autonomy shortly, after I have made the point on isolation clearer.) In both concepts, 
isolation of objects, as containers of properties, is accomplished by information 
hiding. As we know, this means that exogenously induced change of an object can 
only take place via a set of specific mechanisms, subsumed as its interface. With 
some refinement, this idea may serve as foundation of a general ontology which is 
able to solve our problem, at least for practical purposes. What needs to be 
examined in more detail is the concept of isolating mechanisms. For example, in 
Object Oriented Modeling, these mechanisms are allowed to be arbitrary functions, 
while in Agent Based Modeling the set of isolating mechanisms is explicitly requested 
to map the autonomy of the agent’s (more or less strictly defined) preimage. 
 
Relating to the general problem, my choice of characteristics of the mechanisms in 
question is based on the following considerations. Since the concept of autonomy 
reflects the isolation of an objects properties from a certain set of causal influences, I 
will propose the notion of causation to be the constituting aspect of isolating 
mechanisms. Manipulation will serve as means to identify a mechanism’s existence 
and genetic principle, which accords to a, so to speak, pragmatic epistemological 
conviction. 
                                               
9
 The reader may ask himself if this identi¯ cation is meant to be a feature of `perception' 
or of `reality'. This question can not be answered with certainty. Of course some of our 
beliefs may prove more valuable than others and possibly be closer to `reality'. 
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Because of the importance of these considerations, I will give a short summary: 
Objects are isolated from its environment by a bundle of primitive causal 
mechanisms, with causality being understood in a manipulative sense. 
 
The Concepts of Level and Autonomy 
 
Now having a definition of identity of objects, one can turn towards compounds of 
those. A first step is to decide on a definition of level. In accordance with the causal 
approach to identity I will understand a level as the set of all objects which contain 
properties that are connected by causal mechanisms. 
 
To locate a levels position in a specific hierarchy, it becomes necessary to refine the 
above criterium of identity in order to cover composite objects. This is accomplished 
by invocation of the concept of autonomy: Given that a set of lower level objects has 
a structure which exhibits relative environmental autonomy, aggregated joint 
mechanisms may be declared on it. As a result, a higher level object may be 
identified by virtue of these higher level mechanisms. It should be noted, that within 
this scheme the granularity of mechanisms (and thus objects) is ultimately 
determined by what manipulations one is able to imagine and perform. Certainly a 
description of some granularity may perform better than another. 
 
In most applications, autonomy is fed into the model ex ante. Normally, the modeler 
has predefined ideas about the preimages of both element and system levels. 
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However, subsets of the system may exhibit autonomy, which can be identified by 
analyzing the functionality of the subsystems state-space.10 
 
Level-transitory statements are at the core of interest in analysis of complex systems. 
However, it is important to note that those statements must not be considered as 
causal, since in this case the notion of level would be rendered meaningless. It is a 
better understanding to say that certain local states result from the dynamics of the 
system, which can be summarized phenomenologically by a level-transitory 
formulation. 
 
Due to the setting of this article, the treatment of above subjects can only be a 
sketchy one. For more elaborate philosophical discussion the reader is again referred 
to Schwenk (2006) and especially to Bischof (1998), Bunge (1979), Kim (1998), Pearl 
(2000), Sosa and Tooley (1993) and Stegmueller (1983). 
 
Global Behavior in Local Terms  
After having introduced the ontology of the approach, I will discuss how it can be 
implemented using formal calculus. As a first step, let’s have a look on how identity 
and aggregation are handled in a selection of methods. 
                                               
10
 Undertaking parameter studies in order to examine its attractor structure would be 
an example. 
 
 47
 
Agent Based Modeling 
 
As has been said, in ABM determination of identity, or in reverse formulation system 
decomposition, is achieved by both information hiding and bundling of properties; 
with the latter being aimed at devising self contained entities. 
 
Aggregation, or system synthesis, is achieved by synchronized execution of the 
programm formed by the set of coupled agents. Naturally, program execution is the 
default mode of inference and thus system synthesis in computer simulation. 
Examination of the models trajectory, resp. it’s behavior in state space is the 
standard mode of discussing system behavior. 
 
System Theory 
 
Another major paradigm is System Theory 11, which can be regarded as a variety of 
the theory of differential equations (compare Bischof (1998) for an introduction for 
social scientists). Here, the systems components are operators, functions which 
transform input-functions into output-functions. 
 
System decomposition in System Theory takes place by formulating a system of 
equations. Usually, one ought to begin modeling the system by declaring a black box, 
with only gross input- and output-variables known. The black box is replaced by 
incrementally complex systems of explicit operator-functions until a satisfactory 
granularity is reached. It should be noted, that „object“ is no genuine term of systems 
                                               
11
 It seems that, depending on the scienti¯ c community, `Cybernetics', `Control Theory' 
or `Signal Processing' would have also been good choices. 
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theory, nor is causality: This allows for coupling of variables regardless of 
considerations about their location within a hierarchy of levels. 12 
 
The key strength of Systems Theory is that it provides tools for systems synthesis. 
Certainly the systems trajectory as response to input can be computed by simulation. 
Moreover, the component operators can be aggregated algebraically in order to yield 
the system operator. Eventually, analytic propositions about system stability may be 
accessed by employing Laplace- or Z-transforms. 
 
Probabilistic Graphical Models 
 
The formalism I am most interested in, is those of Probabilistic Graphical Models, 
which is also known as Bayesian Networks 13. It is a variety of Probability Theory 
(compare Jaynes (1974)), which enables decomposed formulation of joint probability 
distributions. Graphical Models are currently popular in Artificial Intelligence, 
Bioinformatics and Epidemiology. I will postpone more detailed treatment to the next 
section and continue the comparison. 
 
In Graphical Models, component properties are isolated by their structure of 
conditional statistical independence, which is encoded in a special kind of network, 
an directed acyclic graph. Most important is that a causal operators for such 
                                               
12
 If I remember correctly, this was something which astonished me when ¯ rst looking 
at the design diagram of Jay Forresters well kown WORLD I model. 
 
13
 I will use both terms interchangeably: I made contact with the topic over the AI- 
tradition of reasoning under uncertainty, in which the term "Bayesian Network" is com- 
mon. "Graphical Model" is a rather statistical term which has grown faster in popularity. 
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independence structures exist, (compare Pearl (2000) ), connecting above 
considerations on identity and level to formal inference. 
 
The information stored in the components of the independence graph (the statistical 
associations between variables) can be considered al local and may be aggregated 
to yield a global joint probability distribution (which is accomplished by the so called 
Chain Rule for Bayesian Networks, as introduced below). 
 
Perhaps the most significant logical aspect of Probability Theory is that it encodes 
abductive or likelihood reasoning. Abduction is the inversion of deduction: A ⇒ B, B 
is there, therefore A is more plausible; how plausible is coded in terms of probability. 
It can be interpreted that it is the possibility of multiple causation which corresponds 
with the use of probability in abduction. Thus, with joint probability distributions 
expressed by independence graphs, it is now feasible to employ abduction for 
reasoning about multicausality in structured systems. 
 
One should note that a joint probability model represents the local dependence 
information simultaneously, and both abduction and deduction are employed to 
access the stored information in elementary or aggregated form. 
 
A Sketch of Graphical Models 
Now I want introduce the Graphical Model formalism in slightly more depth. Aim is to 
show how it can be used for level transitory inference in social science modeling. 
Starting point is a short description of the calculus. 
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Formalities 
 
First, I will briefly review some basic concepts of Probability Theory. Then I will give 
an cursory introduction to the concepts necessary for building Bayesian Network 
models. For reasons of brevity I will spare many details and especially the treatment 
of inference algorithms. 
 
Decomposition of Joint Probability Distributions 
 
The first concept to introduce is the concept of joint probability distribution. This is a 
mathematical structure, where every joint occurrence a statement is attributed a 
probability. Presumably you are familiar with the Fundamental Theorem of Probability 
Theory, which shows the equivalence of the joint probability with a product of a 
conditional- and a marginal probability: 
 
 
 
This formula can certainly be extended for a joint of more than two variables, which 
leads to the Chain Rule: 
 
 
 
Applying the Chain Rule allows for the decomposition of a joint probability distribution 
into a product of conditional- and marginal distributions. 
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This immediately results in the following semantic advantage: Now the system of 
variables in scope can be described by their marginal distributions (as elementary 
properties) and their relationships in terms of conditional probabilities. So to speak, 
global probabilistic propositions can be decomposed into local ones. 
 
Graphs and Conditional Independence 
 
Within the Chain Rule, indirect relationships between variables are represented 
explicitly. This prohibits the design of a network model, of the system, since it would 
contain unnecessary connections between the marginal distributions. This can be 
avoided by accounting for conditional independence 14 of the considered variables: 
Two variables X and Y are said to be conditionally independent given Z if 
 
 
 
Given, that our network model should map the directions of the relations 15and should 
furthermore contain no cycles (which is imperative since the elementary relations are 
to be represented simultaneously), we can find the set of prior variables in this 
network which makes a certain variable xj independent of all its other predecessors . 
This set is called Parents of xj or paj . To eliminate all indirect connections towards xj 
out of the directed and acyclic network, the Parents of xj need to satisfy the following 
condition: 
 
                                               
14
 More implications of conditional independence can be found at Pearl (2000) p.11, 
Graphoid Axioms". 
 
15
 Usually one has to decide on the ordering of the variables by causal intuition. Never- 
theless there exist methods to extract causal orderings form data as is introduced at Pearl 
(2000). 
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This is the Markov-Parentship-Criterion for directed acyclic graphs. It is exactly this 
criterion which is employed to define the autonomy, resp. isolatability of an object 
with respect to certain, a priori known properties. 
 
The Parentship-Criterion can easily be applied to the Chain Rule. This finally allows 
for the decomposition necessary for local representation of a joint probability 
distribution by a directed acyclic graph by invoking the Chain Rule for Bayesian 
Networks: 
 
This equation, together with the prerequisite of representation of the conditional 
independence-relations between the marginal distributions via a directed acyclic 
graph defines a bayesian network. 
 
Inference in Graphical Models 
 
Reasoning in Probability Calculus consists basically of projecting a joint probability 
distribution down to subsets of it: may that be joints, marginals or conditional 
probabilities. 
 
So, the joint probability of two variables (Y;X) can be projected towards the 
probability of the occurrence of a certain value yi of the variable Y by summing over 
the values of X: 
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This is also called marginalization and is denoted the following way, if applied to 
distributions: 
 
 
 
Conditional probabilities can be accessed by employing both fundamen- tal theorem 
and marginalization: 
 
 
 
As stretched before, the strength of Probability Calculus can be seen in the natural 
ability of performing abductive resp. likelihood reasoning e±ciently. The inversion of a 
conditional probability is accomplished by Bayes’ Theorem: 
 
 
 
But as mentioned, a necessary prerequisite for all computations but for abductive 
reasoning is access to the joint probability distribution. This may only be the case in 
the most seldom cases, since it grows exponentially with the number of variable 
values. Consequently, the local representation by a Bayesian Network allows for the 
employment of local computations in order to gain results which may be intractable 
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by common methods. This is accomplished by the various inference algorithms. For 
more information on this topic, the reader is referred to Baldi / Brunak (2001), Gilks 
et.al. (1995), Jensen (2001) and Pearl  (1988, 2000). 
 
System Interpretation 
With respect to application, systemic interpretation of probability models represents 
the core of this approach. It consists in a classification of possible statements with 
respect to the methodological considerations made above. 
 
In short, the systemic semantics associated with Graphical Models can be 
summarized as follows: 
 
• Objects are mapped on sets of random variables. 
• Causal mechanisms are mapped on conditional statements. 
• Expressions (conditional statements included) which contain only marginal 
terms are defined al local. 
• Expressions (conditional statements included) which contain joint terms are 
defined al global. 
 
Application of this semantics to level transitory analysis will be demonstrated 
subsequently. It is noteworthy that such a semantic could be in principle be ported to 
a different calculus, with some function of single variables designating local 
statements and and some function of a set of variables designating global 
statements. What would need to be examined is the syntactical basis of the notion of 
 55
„causal mechanism“ (as it is connected to the notion of identity) and the according 
mechanism of inference. 
 
I do not present such a porting at this point. However, the reader may consider the 
idea when he is analyzing a model of his own, which is not a probabilistic one. To 
me, the above methodological ideas seem possibly quite fertile, even if they are not 
implemented using the most powerful tool. 16 
 
Operationalization and Parameter Learning 
It is inevitable to mention another core strength of probability theory, namely it’s 
capability of modeling real world data. The reader may be familiar with the ubiquitous 
statistical methodology which is used for this task. 
 
However, with stochastic measurement theories (compare van der Linden / 
Hambleton (1997)) there exist tools which are explicitly designed to parameterize 
social science models. A key aspect of those tools is the employment of maximum 
likelihood, resp. maximum a posterori methods for inference of hidden parameters. 
Obviously these tools go hand in hand with a probabilistic approach to system 
representation, resulting in the possibility of very sophisticated operationalizations, 
which is normally not paralleled in Agent Based Modeling. 
                                               
16
 Admittedly, there may be pragmatic reasons to abstain from direct probability for- 
mulations, as lack of computing power or convenience of formulation. 
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A Toy Example 
Now I will give a brief example in form of a reproduction of the so called „Kirk-
Coleman-Model“ (see Kirk / Coleman 1967 and Schwenk (2004b)), which is non-
operational and simulates the dynamics of interaction and liking in a three-person 
group. 
 
Brief Model Description 
 
Theoretical basis of the original model are the „social behaviorist“ works of Homans 
(1961), while the actual version is modified in direction of Expected Utility-Theory and 
Social Impact Theory. The qualitative structure of the model is like this:  
 
Within every „agent“ Ai there exist three types of (local) random variables: 
 
• It’s Attitudei 
• It’s Trustij to the other „agents”Aj 
• The communicative Actioni it will chose 
 
The structure of functional dependencies BAi attributed to the variables of a single 
„agent' Ai is the following: 
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For reasons of brevity, I will abstain from giving a detailed description of these 
functions, the reader may be referred to Schwenk (2004a) pp.45. However it should 
be noted, that these functions are implemented as discrete probability tables.17 If 
those dependencies variables are coupled over the agents, the graph of a time slice 
of the model looks as depicted in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1: The top line of nodes represents the systems composition at time t, the bottom line at time t + 1. The 
first three nodes in a line represent the action variables of the respective „agents' (indexed i = {1; 2; 3}), the 
following six the trust variables for every possible interaction (indexed ij = {12; 13; 21; 23; 31; 32} ) while the 
last three nodes in a line represent the “agents“ attitude variables (indexed i = {1; 2; 3}). 
                                               
17
 A major reason for this has been restrictions on the availability of inference engines 
(compare the previous section) in line with project schedule. 
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Higher Level 
 
Subsequently I will demonstrate an instance of level-transitory analysis, with the 
levels being defined a priori. (Reason for this is that the model has only a single 
attractor which is actor’s indifference, resp. a joint uniform distribution over all 
variables. Being a constant property, it cannot supply a meaningful partition of the 
systems state space.) 
 
One possible definition of the systems global property space is given by Heider’s 
(1958) Theory of Structural Balance. The theory can be summarized in metaphorical 
terms as follows. If within a three person group (a triad) 18 relations like „the friend of 
my friend is my friend“ and „the enemy of my friend is my enemy“ are fulfilled, the 
triad is said to be balanced. Otherwise, the triad is unbalanced, which leads to 
cognitive dissonance and consequently instability of the configuration. 19 
 
Within the model at hand, differences between „agents“ attitudes have been mapped 
towards an evaluation variable. Is this difference lower than a certain threshold, the 
evaluation of the respective other agent is positive (+), otherwise it is negative (-). 
Thus the attitude space of the model has been mapped onto an evaluation space 
which is partitioned by Balance Theory into balance states and their realizing 
configurations (commonly called P-O-X triples), as depicted in Figure 2 and Figure 3. 
                                               
18
 Generalization to sets of triads is both feasible and common. 
 
19
 A memory hook for this rule may be that it parallels multiplication of signs in elemen- 
tary algebra. `The enemy of my enemy is my friend' can be modeled by (-) * (-) = (+) 
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Figure 2: Balanced Triads (0 ≡ -, 1 ≡ +) 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Balanced Triads (0 ≡ -, 1 ≡ +) 
 
Level Transition 
 
With this as starting point one could arbitrarily ask, how the immediate choice of an 
interaction partner (a local property) might depend on the balance state of the 
system, resp. on its realizing triad configuration (both being global properties).20 As 
showcase, I choose agent 2 as target of „top-down influences“. This results in 
computation of the following quantity over the possible configurations of its 
conditions: 
 
                                               
20
 As stated before, it is very important to note that such top-down-in°uences must not 
be called causal, since in this case the notion of level would be rendered meaningless. It is 
a better formulation, that the top-down formulation aggregates over the processes of the 
system. Compare Schwenk (2004b); 
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The probability distributions have been aggregated to be mapped on balance states, 
according to their respective definition. This yields the following table, which 
describes the phenomenological top-down dependencies between balancedness and 
interaction choice of „agent“ 2, which is now labeled „O“ according to Balance Theory 
schematics. 
 
Class Pmu(ActionO=P) Pmu(ActionO=X) SDPmu(ActionO) 
P-O-X 1 0.5000 0.5000 0.0490 
P-O-X 2 0.7273 0.2727 0.1080 
P-O-X 3 0.5000 0.5000 0.2031 
P-O-X 4 0.2727 0.7273 0.1080 
P-O-X 5 0.3954 0.6046 0.0344 
P-O-X 6 0.5000 0.5000 0.0421 
P-O-X 7 0.6046 0.3954 0.0344 
P-O-X 8 0.5000 0.5000 0.3674 
Balanced 0.5000 0.5000 0.1887 
Unbalanced 0.5000 0.5000 0.0714 
 
For interpretation the reader is referred to Schwenk (2004a) pp.68. Reason for 
sparing the interpretation is the arbitrariness in choice of the threshold of the 
mentioned evaluation variable. Large parts of the interpretation are determined by 
this, which is one of the reasons to call it a „toy model“. However, what is important 
for this demonstration, is the logical structure of these level-transitory inferences. 
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Prospects – Employing the Methodology  
 
I will conclude this article with a remark concerning advantages and handicaps of an 
probabilistic approach to actor-centered modeling. The key issue is the following: 
 
Coherent higher level and level-transitory inference is no matter of course in the 
analysis of structured systems. However, this is necessary since comprehension of 
complex processes is always accompanied by the introduction of functional higher 
levels. As shown, Graphical Models can be supplied with a precise interpretation 
which allows exactly for this. 
 
Returning to application, it may not be advantageous to em ploy a probabilistic 
approach under some circumstances. This may be the case if the model has a large 
number of components and/or has long range focus; Here probabilistic inference may 
be simply too time consuming. On the other hand, the project may heavily rely on 
intuitive model formulation, as for example a participatory modeling enterprize. In this 
case, a probability model may be harder to communicate than some alternative, e.g. 
rule-based model. 
 
The most frequent case may simply be that component theories of a model are 
formulated in deterministic language. Maybe an effort to reformulate those 
probabilistically is feasible, or alternatively a post hoc probabilistic model can be set 
up on simulation data; Even if this is not the case, I still encourage the reader to keep 
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above methodological considerations (and especially systemic semantics) in mind, 
while he is inferring conclusions from his own model. 
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Abstract 
 
The concept of heuristic decision making is adapted to dynamic influence processes 
in social networks. We report results of a set of simulations, in which we 
systematically varied: a) the agents’ strategies for contacting fellow group members 
and integrating collected information, and (b) features of their social environment—
the distribution of members’ status, and the degree of clustering in their network. As 
major outcome variables, we measured the speed with which the process settled, the 
distributions of agents’ final preferences, and the rate with which high-status 
members changed their initial preferences. The impact of the agents’ decision 
strategies on the dynamics and outcomes of the influence process depended on the 
                                               
21
 Part of the simulation study has been presented at the Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society (see 
Schwenk & Reimer, 2007).  
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features of their social environment. This held in particular true when agents 
contacted all of the neighbors with whom they were connected. When agents 
focused on high-status members and did not contact low-status neighbors, the 
process typically settled more quickly, yielded larger majority factions and fewer 
preference changes. A case study exemplifies the empirical application of the model. 
 
Keywords: Decision making; cognition; heuristics; small world networks; social 
influence; bounded rationality. 
Introduction 
 
Research into group decision making indicates that group decisions often strongly 
depend on the distribution of individual group members’ preferences (Davis, 1973; 
Kerr & Tindale, 2004). A popular example is the majority rule that committees and 
teams often employ when they do not reach unanimity (Hastie & Kameda, 2005;; 
Sorkin, West, & Robinson, 1998). When groups integrate their members’ opinions on 
the basis of a majority rule, the group decision is determined by the distribution of 
individual votes. In the present paper we will address the question of how the 
distribution of individual group members’ preferences as a central input to group 
processes develop in a dynamic social environment.  
Prior studies revealed that the distribution of preferences and opinions in 
groups depends on how the individual group members process their information 
when working on a choice task (Reimer & Hoffrage, 2006, 2005). For example, in one 
set of simulation studies we compared the performance of groups whose members 
used either a compensatory decision strategy (a weighted additive model or a unit-
weight model) or a non-compensatory heuristic (Take the Best or the Minimalist 
Heuristic; see Gigerenzer, Todd, & the ABC Research Group, 1999). All groups 
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integrated the individual members’ decisions on the basis of a majority rule. The 
fraction of members who preferred the correct decision alternative, and consequently, 
the performance of the groups, depended on the strategies the individual group 
members applied and on features of the information environment. In particular, in 
environments in which validities were linearly distributed, groups using a 
compensatory strategy achieved the highest degree of accuracy. Conversely, when 
the distribution of cue validities was skewed, groups using a simple lexicographic 
heuristic performed best. 
In these prior studies we considered only static environments, in which group 
members formed their decisions separately without influencing each other. Here we 
have extended this approach to a dynamic context, in which agents are assumed to 
communicate with and influence each other prior to the group decision process. In 
line with Carley, Prietula & Lin (1998), as well as Sun & Nahve (2004), we argue that 
it is important to consider agents’ cognitive capabilities when examining information 
processing in a multi-agent environment. Following the view of Gigerenzer et al. 
(1999), we consider it plausible that agents use simple cognitive processes for a 
possible wide array of contexts, including decision-making in complex social 
networks. In the current study we applied some of these fast and frugal heuristics to a 
dynamic context: We explored social influence processes in various social networks, 
in which the individual agents used, either fast and frugal heuristics to form their 
opinions, or compensatory decision strategies that demand greater cognitive 
resources. To be more precise, agents contacted each other based on certain 
contact rules and updated their individual opinions based on certain decision 
strategies that integrated the opinions of their fellow neighbors who were contacted.  
 68
Overview 
The thought experiment allowed us to explore the extent to which influence 
processes in social networks depend on the decision strategies that are used by the 
networks’ agents. As in the case of group decision making, it is reasonable to 
assume that potential effects of decision strategies on global outcomes of a network 
depend on features of the social environment. We focused on the following two 
features that we systematically manipulated: the distribution of the agents’ status, 
and the structure of the communication networks. The strength of social influence 
was measured as the rate with which high status members in a network change their 
initial preferences. Analogous to research on cue-based group decision-making, we 
modeled member’s opinions as cue variables for individual decision making: instead 
of processing information on cues, the agents in the network integrated the opinions 
of other agents into an individual decision. While this framework departs from the 
prominent understanding of social influence, which sees social influence as an 
activity of “social forces” (cf. French 1956, Latané 1981, and Turner 1996) rather than 
as an instance of information processing, to us, it seems to be a very plausible 
approach to conceptualize social influence processes within an information-
processing framework (see Latané, & L’Herrou, 1996 and Mason, Conrey & Smith 
2007). 
In addition to status hierarchies we considered different network structures as 
an environmental feature that can affect and moderate social influence processes 
(see Festinger et al, 1950; French, 1956; Friedkin, 1998; Latané, 1996; and Latané & 
L’Herrou 1996). We considered networks of stable contacts, as is common in the field 
of social network analysis (Wasserman & Faust 1994), and varied the degree of 
clustering in the networks. Previous research (Latané, 1996, Latané & L’Herrou, 
1996) has shown that the way a communication network is clustered is a major factor 
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in the prediction of the persistence of minority groups and, therefore, also a factor 
that may determine the extent to which high status members may be influenced by 
social interactions.  
We focused on the following questions, taken together, regarding global 
outcomes of social influence processes: Under which conditions do members’ 
preferences converge in a dynamic environment, in which agents communicate with 
each other and update their individual opinions? Are the faction sizes in the agents’ 
network affected by the agents’ decision strategies, the distribution of their status, 
and the structure of their network? More specifically, under which conditions do high 
status group members change their initial opinions? To shed light on these questions 
we constructed a simulation model and conducted a systematic study of the model’s 
behavior. 
Background Scenario 
Our simulation model can be exemplified by the following scenario which we adapted 
from Lazega (2001): consider a group of lawyers who are partners in a law firm. In 
regular intervals these partners gather in a partnership meeting in order to decide 
about topics concerning the firm, for instance, the branch of business in which the 
firm should further expand. In the time between those meetings the partners 
communicate among each other, of course, in a pattern aligned with their formal work 
demands and informal preferences. At times they also communicate with each other 
about the forthcoming meeting. During the course of their communication the 
partners may possibly alter their views and opinions on the topic to be discussed, 
therefore changing the communication environment of their fellow partners. 
Eventually, this repeated process either converges to unanimous views on the 
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mentioned topics or leads to entrenchment of factions in the forthcoming partnership 
meeting.  
General Model Structure 
We implemented the above scenario in the simulation model in the following way: 
The lawyers of our example were represented by a set of 21 agents, each having a 
certain preference for a branch of business into which the firm should expand (let us 
say corporate law, litigation, or public law). Each lawyer was assigned a certain 
status value, which determined whether this agent was considered a high or low 
status member of the network, which neighbors were contacted by the lawyer, and 
how much influence the lawyer had on the preferences of other lawyers who might 
contact him/her. Furthermore, a directed network connected the agents and 
represented their persistent communication channels. Every agent was assumed to 
update his/her preference according to some decision strategy. This strategy 
consisted of a contact rule, which selected communication partners from the agents’ 
local network neighborhood, and a decision rule, which integrated the absorbed 
information. The decision strategies we implemented differed in the extent to which 
they considered the preferences and status values of the agent and his/her 
neighbors in the network. Note: this environment was dynamic in that the simulation 
proceeded by computing repeated updates of all preferences of individual agents. 
In more formal terms the model structure can be declared as follows: let the 
lawyers be represented by a set L of Nl=21 agents. Each agent li is associated with 
both a value di of a decision variable D, which contains three discrete values 
D=:{corporate law, litigation, public law} and a value si of  an individual status variable 
S having continuous values in the range of (0.5,…, 1.0). Furthermore, a directed 
graph G, describes a network of directed communication channels cji between the 
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agents L: G:={L,C}. Finally, each agent li is assigned a decision strategy f out of a set 
of decision strategies F. This function f consists of a contact rule rc and a decision 
rule rd and maps an agent’s actual decision state dj_n onto his/her subsequent state 
di_n+1. The iterated and sequential call of this decision rule f for all agents results in a 
dynamic evolution of the model.  
In the next paragraphs we describe the three central features of our model in 
more detail: a) the contact and decision rules, rc and rd, used by the individual agents; 
b) how the members’ status was distributed in a network; and c) the clustering 
structure of the communication network.  
Contact Rules and Decision Rules  
Decision strategies can be conceptualized on the basis of the following building 
blocks (Gigerenzer et al., 1999): a) a search rule, b) a stopping rule, and c) a 
decision rule. In order to tailor the decision strategies to our task of decision making 
in a dynamic network, including ongoing interactions between agents, we added an 
additional building block by including a contact rule. In our simulation we considered  
 
two contact and four decision rules.  According to the first contact rule, agents 
contact every direct neighbor in their network, regardless of their status.  
 
We call this rule the “contact all” or ALL rule. According to the second rule, agents 
contact only those neighbors who have at least the same (or a higher) status value wj 
as the agents themselves.  
 
NeighborsContacted =
selfj wwNeighborsContacted ≥= |
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We name this rule the “higher equal” or HE rule. Its inclusion is based on 
observations in research on collective choice, which indicate that group members 
who have high levels of expertise are at times more influential in the group decision 
process than members who have less expertise (e.g., Bonner, Baumann, Lehn, 
Pierce, & Wheeler, 2006). Note: both rules include the searching agent 
himself/herself as an information source. 
Regarding the decision component, we modeled an ensemble of four decision 
strategies (see Reimer & Hoffrage, 2006). These decision strategies describe how 
decision makers integrate cue-based information when choosing an alternative in a 
choice task. The first strategy, the “weighted additive model” or WADD-rule, is a 
compensatory rule that integrates all of the available information. WADD chooses the 
alternative with the highest weighted sum; the weight being the cue’s respective 
validity. In the present application, in which a decision maker integrates opinions of 
other agents instead of cue values, WADD decides in favor of the alternative for 
which most contacted neighbors vote, each member’s vote being weighted with 
his/her status value. In more formal terms, the WADD-rule can be expressed using 
the following equations: 
 
IAi designates the inference of agent A made on a specific alternative i. This inference 
IAi is computed in two steps. Firstly, the available opinion oji of neighbor j on 
alternative i is weighted with the latter neighbor’s status wj. Secondly, all k neighbors’ 
weighted opinions  wjoji are summed up. Agent A chooses the inference IAi with 
maximal value as her preference  OA.  
max
1
⇒=
=
∑
=
AiA
k
j
jijAi
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owI
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The second rule is the “unit weight model” or UWM-rule, which is also 
compensatory and analogous to the WADD-rule with one significant difference: 
status values are generally treated as being in unity, thus information about individual 
status is ignored. The UWM strategy therefore determines the number of neighbors 
who favor a specific alternative and adopts the one which is favored most frequently. 
Consequently, it can be interpreted as a local majority vote over the different decision 
alternatives (Reimer & Hoffrage, in press). The UWM-rule can be expressed using 
the following equations, with symbols as introduced above:  
 
The third rule is a decision heuristic called the “minimalist” or MIN-rule. Here one of 
the k neighbors’ opinions Oj , which have been gathered during the contact phase, is 
chosen at random with uniform probability. In other words, the MIN-rule follows the 
opinion of a randomly chosen neighbor j who has been contacted. The rule can be 
formally expressed as follows: 
 
The last decision rule employed, the “follow the leader” or FTL-rule, is also a non-
compensatory one. The strategy follows the decision of the “leader” - the neighbor j 
with the highest status wj among all contacted neighbors. The rule has been modeled 
in analogy to the “take the best” heuristic for cue-based decision making (Gigerenzer 
et al., 1999) and can be expressed using the following equation. 
 
 
As can be seen in Table 1, we have considered all possible combinations of contact 
and decision rules. The FTL-rule is listed only once, because it makes no difference 
max!
1
⇒=
=
∑
=
AiA
k
j
jiAi
EO
oE
ContactedjOunifO jA ∈≈ |)(
)sup(| jjA wjOO →=
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whether the leader is selected from amongst all neighbors or only from amongst the 
subset of higher status neighbors. 
 
Table 1: Contact and Decision Rules Considered. 
 
Contact Rule Decision Rule 
HE  (higher equal) UWM      (unit weight model) 
HE  (higher equal) WADD   (weighted additive) 
HE  (higher equal)   MIN        (minimalist) 
HE  (higher equal)   FTL        (follow the leader) 
ALL (all neighbors) UWM    (unit weight model) 
ALL (all neighbors) WADD  (weighted additive) 
ALL (all neighbors)   MIN       (minimalist) 
 
Decision Environments 
As for further features in our simulation, we varied two dimensions of the decision 
environment: the distribution of the agents’ status in a network, and the structure of 
the communication network. 
Status Distributions  
 
The first feature of the decision environment (respectively the input variables of the 
set of agents’ decision rules) was the distribution DS of status values sj. 
We considered three shapes of status distribution, each with increasing 
steepness. The first is a linear distribution which contains equal proportions of values 
over its entire range. The second is a flat J-shaped distribution which contains 
considerably more high values than medium or low values. The last status 
distribution is a steep J-shaped distribution which contains only few high status 
values and a majority of low status values (see Reimer & Hoffrage, 2006, for 
respective distributions of cue validities).  
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The status values of the distributions were randomly assigned to the agents, 
because in our model we had no external criterion with which status was correlated. 
For the same reason, the absolute range of the distributions was effectively 
arbitrary.22 We chose a range of (0.5,..,1.0), in line with prior studies in which we 
considered validities (Reimer & Hoffrage, 2006). 
 
Network Structures  
 
The second feature of the decision environment, which we systematically varied in 
our simulation, was the structure of the communication network. Research on social 
influence processes in networks shows the eminence of the degree of clustering of a 
communication network. For example, Latané & L’Herrou (1996) found that high local 
clustering contributes to the emergence of stable clusters of opinions, because it 
allows members to shield each other against external influence. The analyses of 
Latané and L’Herrou considered regular grid structures and regular grids of irregular 
(and highly clustered) substructures. We implemented a type of random graph, which 
allows for variation of the clustering properties of a network in a more controlled 
manner.  
More specifically, we generated random graphs from the family of so called 
“small world networks” (Albert & Barábasi 2001, Newman 2003, and Watts 1999). 
This type of network has attracted considerable interest, because it plausibly 
captures characteristics of real-world social networks, namely the joint occurrence of 
both high local clustering coefficients and short average path lengths. This is also 
known as the small-world effect. Both the model as well as its name have their roots 
in the observation that seemingly unrelated persons often have mutual 
acquaintances and are therefore reachable via only a few intermediaries. 
                                               
22
 Originally, we employed both high and low valued linear status distributions. As expected, both induced 
exactly the same process behavior. 
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An intuitive illustration of the small world model can be given as follows: let us 
suppose individuals are situated in spatial units, such as an office hall in a company 
building or a neighborhood of a town. Then it should be plausible to expect strong 
connectivity within such a unit. Furthermore, one could expect that some member of 
a unit also knows some members of another, different unit who are also strongly 
connected locally. Related to our example, the spatial units could correspond to 
different office halls in the law firm’s building. 
We generated small world networks as suggested by Watts (1999). The 
implemented procedure has been as follows. First, a regular ring network was 
created in which each of the n nodes was connected to k neighbors on each side. 
This structure is called cyclic substrate, and as a regular grid it yields high local 
clustering, thus representing a characteristic of spatial organization. After this 
individual edges of the grid were rewired with a certain probability pr with randomly 
chosen nodes. Introduction of these shortcuts, with a rewiring probability ranging 
approximately within the interval of pr = (0.001,…0.2), led to the creation of a network 
with the mentioned small world effect: strong clustering, but no isolated highly 
clustered regions. A graphic example of such a small world net is displayed in Figure 
1.  
 
 
Figure 1: Small world network (n=21, k=2, p=0.1). Note: The network has been created by introducing shortcut 
ties to a regular ring network, where every node is connected to two neighbors on each side. 
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Of special interest for our question is the fact that by varying the rewiring probability 
pr, we are able to produce an array of differently clustered networks. A parameter of 
pr=0 results in a completely regular and highly clustered network, whereas a 
parameter of pr=0.1 results in a small-world network, and a parameter of pr=1 results 
in a random and unclustered network, the so called random regular graph (see Table 
2.) We employed these three parameter settings as variations of the agents’ network 
environments, thus controlling for the effects of clustering and average path length. 
Furthermore, we set the number of agent’s neighbors to approx. four (k=2 on each 
side) over all three variations. 
 
Table 2: Employed Variations of the Small-World Model 
(n=21, k=2). 
 
Rewiring Probability Characteristic 
pr=0 Cyclic Regular, high clustering 
pr=0.1 Small-world  
pr=1 Random regular, no clustering 
 
 
Additionally, we considered a completely connected network as a control condition in 
order to observe the model’s behavior in the absence of structural effects. In general, 
we assumed the networks to have loops – every agent was connected to 
himself/herself and, thus, had access to his/her own decisions. 
Initial Values and Setup of the Simulation Experiment  
 
Initial values were set according to certain criteria: The initial distribution of decision 
values dj over the agents was assumed to be uniform, so that every alternative was 
assigned to exactly seven agents. Next, status values were randomly assigned to 
agents. Thus, we assumed no correlation of status values sj and initial decision 
values dj..  
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In the next step, every possible combination of decision rule, status 
distribution, and network structure was simulated 1000 times, each with a newly 
sampled network and a process length of 50 cycles. 
Results of the Simulation Experiment 
The manipulation of decision rules, network topologies, and status distributions had 
several effects on global outcomes of the influence process. In the following, we will 
report results regarding equilibrium and the final distributions of the agents’ opinions, 
and the ratio with which high-status agents changed their initial opinions. All reported 
differences were tested with Hotelling’s T2-tests and were significant at α=0.01 level. 
 
Equilibrium and final distributions of individual opinions  
 
Equilibrium has been achieved in all variations of the model at considerably fast 
rates. While it took groups employing a MIN decision rule approximately 25 cycles on 
average to reach a static equilibrium, the remaining rules converged within two to 
seven cycles. Without exception, strategies containing the HE-rule showed the 
fastest rates of convergence: overall, networks reached a state of equilibrium faster 
when agents contacted only higher-status members than when agents contacted all 
members with which they were connected. 
However, the reached equilibrium was usually one of entrenched factions 
including stable subsets of agents favoring a minority position. In general, unanimity 
could only be achieved in the case of the complete network or when agents applied 
the ALL-MIN strategy. The latter finding appears straightforward since this particular 
strategy does not defend any preference held at a certain step of the process. 
Exceptional cases are the ALL-UWM and ALL-WADD strategies in the random 
regular network, which showed substantial probabilities of unanimity of 18% and 6% 
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respectively. Typically, an equilibrium state was reached in which each of the three 
possible choice alternatives was favored by some members. Surprisingly, variation of 
the steepness of the employed status distribution had no effect on the model’s 
equilibrium behavior. We observed equivalent distributions of faction size for all 
status distributions considered. 
Even though each of the three choice alternatives was favored by at least one 
agent in the vast majority of cases, the sizes of the respective factions varied 
substantially. Our results show considerable impact of decision rules and network 
structure on the distribution of faction sizes, as can be seen from Figure 2. Here, 
results were sorted according to the size of the faction in an individual simulation run, 
regardless of the actual choice alternative favored.    
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Figure 2: Mean faction sizes over networks with decreasing clustering. Results were sorted according to the size 
of the faction in an individual simulation run, regardless of the actual choice-alternative favored. A majority is 
reached at eleven. 
 
Different patterns of faction size were observed for strategies containing an HE- or 
ALL contact rule. As expected, the decrease of network clustering generally leads to 
smaller sizes of minority factions.  
Strategies containing the HE rule tend to accentuate contrasts in faction size, 
as can be seen from their steeper slope in the first two sections of Figure 2. While the 
absolute differences are small in numbers, they may however be crucial since they 
decide between plurality and majority, making the majority the stable modal outcome 
for non-compensatory rules, as can be seen from Figure 3.  The profile of the ALL-
MIN heuristic can be considered an outlier, due to its unique opportunism in the literal 
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sense of the word. The aforementioned patterns blur together with decreasing 
clustering, making a majority state commonly the most probable outcome in the case 
of the unstructured random regular network. This is in coherence with Latane & 
L’Herrou’s (1996) finding  that clustering stabilizes minority positions.  
 
 
 
Figure 3: Group level outcomes over networks with decreasing clustering. 
 
An important observation is that the profile of faction sizes for strategies containing 
the HE contact rule is not affected by network clustering. These always behave like 
the strategies containing the ALL rule in absence of clustering. Under the regime of 
the HE contact rule, the decision strategies yielded almost identical results, 
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regardless of the employed network structure. We checked whether this effect occurs 
only because the HE contact rule eliminates all individual decision scenarios except 
the trivial one, where only a single alternative is left. This had been considered 
possible because every agent in the non-complete networks had, on average, only 
five neighbors (including him-/herself). Therefore, we also simulated large networks 
with 31 agents and a structure with steeply varying connectivity from one to fifteen 
neighbors, where elimination of all decision alternatives is implausible. Here we 
observed the same insensitivitizing effect of the HE- contact rule, concluding that this 
effect is not due to the triviality of local decision environments.  
We presume that the HE-rule systematically modifies the network which is 
actually relevant for the transmission of information. We suggest that the exclusion of 
lower status neighbors from the communication process leads to the creation of a 
closed discourse of the agent population’s “elite”. However, we lack a model to infer 
properties of this network in order to support our suggestion systematically. 
Identically shaped distributions of expected faction size could be reproduced 
for three- and five-person committees, which were sampled randomly from the agent 
population. This indicates the relevance of the above effects for situations in which 
group level decisions are based on preferences of only a subset of the group 
members. In order to check for scaling effects, we subsequently repeated the 
simulations for networks containing 9 and 31 agents, in which we observed 
comparable results.  
Taken together, the networks typically reached equilibrium. The contact rule 
had a major impact on the speed with which the network settled and the size of the 
final factions. More specifically, when agents used the HE-rule, equilibrium was 
reached fastest, differences in faction sizes were larger, and the influence of network 
clustering was minimized.  
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Decision Change of High Status Partners  
There is substantial variation of the propensity of the different decision rules to induce 
an opinion change in high status members, which we defined as the subset of agents 
having above average status. The manipulation of network structures and status 
distributions had an effect on opinion changes in high status members. 
 
Network Structure  
 
Focusing on an aggregated view of network structures averaged across status 
distributions, as depicted in Figure 4, we identified the following results. 
 
 
Figure 4: Probability of decision change of high status members over networks with decreasing clustering (cyclic 
regular, small world, random regular) 
 
If status was important for contact behavior, as it was in the case of the HE-rule, the 
probability of a decision change in high status members was constantly low, 
regardless of the decision rule employed.  
If all neighbors were contacted, regardless of their status, as was the case for 
the ALL-rule, the clustering structure became important for the compensatory UWM 
and WADD decision rules. The lower the degree of isolated clustering, the higher the 
probability of decision change of high status members was, which increased in 
parallel about 15% for both decision rules. However, the completely status insensitive 
UWM-rule shows a respective probability which is constantly approx. 10% higher 
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than for the WADD-rule. The MIN rule shows a maximum probability of decision 
change of high status members, which remains constant over all considered 
networks. For completeness, it should be mentioned that in a completely connected 
network, the examined strategies show only minor differences with regard to the 
probability of high status members’ opinion change, which ranges from 54% to 67%.  
The results for the different network types can be summarized as follows: 
contrary to the exception of a completely connected network, the rules’ behavior 
varies considerably over the networks of the small world family. The rules which are 
status-sensitive with respect to their contact behavior (i.e. the rules containing an HE 
- component) are insensitive to changes in the networks’ clustering structure. In 
contrast, the rules containing an ALL - component, which consider all locally available 
information, regardless of status values, are sensitive to changes in the networks’ 
clustering structure. The probability of high status initial decision change in this latter 
case increases with a decrease of clustering. 
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Status Distributions  
 
Another interesting finding regarding the decision rules can be seen in Figure 5. The 
figure displays the probability with which high status members changed their opinion 
separately for different status distributions. Here we consider the impact of the 
steepness of status distributions on the probability of decision change in high status 
members. In order to avoid redundancy we will only present the results for the case 
of the small-world network; however, the same pattern can be found in all networks 
considered.  
 
 
 
Figure 5: Probability of decision change in high status members in a small world network over status 
distributions of increasing steepness 
 
Again, strategies based on the hierarchy-oriented HE-contact rule showed virtually 
identical behavior. However, the HE-decision strategies were sensitive to variation in 
the shape of the status distribution. An increase in the steepness of the hierarchy 
leads to a decrease in the opinion changes in high status members. These can 
preserve their initial decision more effectively in environments with a steep hierarchy. 
To a lesser extent, this sensitivity is also true for the compensatory ALL-WADD 
strategy, which reacts to hierarchy in terms of information weighting. Because of their 
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complete ignorance of the status distribution, ALL-UWM and ALL-MIN are less 
affected by variations in status distributions. 
A Case Study  
To see how the different decision strategies might work and potentially affect the 
social influence process and equilibrium in a real world scenario, we applied our 
model to the study by Lazega (2001), who collected data between January and 
February of 1991 in a New England law firm.23 We used the available empirical data 
as initial values for the simulation model. Combining our model and empirical data, 
we inferred outcomes of a hypothetical influence process. In particular, we were 
interested in eventual sensitivity of the equilibrium distribution of the process towards 
variation of the decision strategies employed by the agents. 
 
Empirical Data  
 
The empirical setup of the case study is similar to our systematic simulation 
experiment, apart from the following differences: the employed data deals with the 
interaction of  n=36 partners and preferences on a binary policy variable, namely 
whether new cases in the law firm should in future be distributed via a central 
authority or kept to being the personal responsibility of the individual lawyers who 
acquired them. Preservation of the status quo was preferred by 20 partners (56%) 
while a change of the case assignment policy was advocated by 16 partners (44%). 
This indicates a narrow majority in favor of preservation of the as – is policy. 
                                               
23
 At this point, we would like to thank Dr. Lazega for his kind permission to use his data for the present study. 
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However, this situation might change due to influence processes occurring among 
the lawyers of the firm – which we tried to infer by simulation. 
In order to model the influence process, partners were asked to say who they 
pay special attention to at partnership meetings. We transposed the reported 
adjacency matrix in order to convert “listening”- into proper “influence”- relations. The 
partner’s status was estimated via the reported individual hourly work fee, which they 
granted each other in the partnership assembly. In our case study, status values 
correspond to a certain partner’s share of the maximal possible hourly work fee. 
Based on this criterion, we determined the empirical status distribution of the law firm, 
which is depicted in Figure 6.  
 
 
 
Figure 6: Status distribution of partners in an empirical network. Partners are numbered according to seniority. 
 
Unlike in our systematic simulation experiment, the empirical data shows a certain 
dependence between higher status and preference of preservation of the current 
workflow policy. This is indicated by a correlation rxy = -0.123 and the odds exp(b) = 
0.093 obtained by a logistic regression analysis. However, these parameters are not 
statistically significant. As can be seen in the illustration of the influence network in 
Figure 7, the network shows formidable complexity. In contrast, Figure 8 shows the 
subnetwork which is relevant according to the HE contact rule. It contains only links 
to neighbors of sufficiently high status and appears much less complex than the 
original. 
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Figure 7: Empirical influence network. Highly connected partners are located in the center of the network. Dark 
and wide arrows represent high status relations. Green nodes represent an “as - is” and red nodes a “less flexible” 
policy opinion. Partners are numbered according to their  seniority. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8: HE – relevant subnet of the empirical influence network: highly connected partners are located in the 
center of the network. Dark and wide arrows represent high status relations. Green nodes represent an “as - is” 
and red nodes a “less flexible” policy opinion. Partners are numbered according to seniority. 
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Inferences  
 
The deductions taken from the simulation model for the empirical case are given in 
Table 3. In line with the results of our systematic simulation experiment, unanimity 
could not be achieved under the regime of the HE-contact rule.  
 
Table 3: Equilibrium preference distributions for the considered strategies as inferred from empirical data. The 
two possible preferences were “keep case assignment as it is” and “organize case assignment less flexible via a 
central authority”. As can bee seen, the equilibrium distributions depart considerably from the initial distribution. 
The results for strategies containing the MIN rule are stochastic, while the others are reached deterministically.  
 
Strategy n(as-is) n(less  
flexible) 
equilibrium 
cycle 
HE - UWM 34 2 7 
HE - WADD 34 2 5 
HE - MIN Majority miniority fluctuating 
HE - FTL 26 10 3 
ALL - UWM 36 0 4 
ALL - WADD 36 0 4 
ALL - MIN 36 (p=0.77) 36 (p=0.23) mean=17.8 
Initial 
Distribution 
20 16  -- 
 
 
In general, the initial majority preference (which was preservation of the decentral 
case assignment policy) prevailed in the influence process and was able to suppress 
the initial minority position to a large extent.  In the case of the ALL – MIN strategy, 
the process converged to unanimous acceptance of the initial majority preference in 
the majority of simulation runs. When the HE contact rule was active, a few agents 
were able to defend their minority position and did not join the majority. As we 
expected from our systematic simulation experiment, the compensation characteristic 
of the decision strategies played a major role in determining features of the inferred 
equilibrium distribution of preferences. Their proportion was largest for the case of 
the FTL decision-rule. In summariy, we may expect substantive variation of the 
outcome of the influence process, depending on the strategies employed by the 
agents. Again, employment of the HE contact rule has the largest impact, deciding 
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over extinction of minority positions.24 In the case of our law firm this could be 
decisive in whether there is faction regarding the vote for the new company policy. 
The size of the minority faction, as it is dependent on the employed decision 
strategies, could bear the potential for discussion or even conflict in the future. 
Conclusion 
 
In this article, we applied the concept of recurrent decision making to processes of 
social influence. Hereby we are filling a gap in the literature, which has analyzed 
social influence primarily as an exercise of a power relationship rather than an 
instance of information processing (cf. French 1956, Latané 1981, and Turner 1996).  
Following this rationale, we examined the interaction of decision strategies and 
features of the communication network. 
 As it turned out, the influence process settled quickly and both the clustering 
structure of the network and the agents’ contact strategies made a substantial 
difference in terms of the  outcomes of the process. In general, unanimity was 
unlikely. Furthermore, highly clustered networks increased the size of the minority 
factions25, which is in coherence to the results of Latané & L’Herrou (1996). However, 
when agents chose only higher status neighbors as information sources, the size of 
the minorities decreased. Of equal importance is the fact that in this case the 
distribution of equilibrium factions became independent from the clustering structure 
of the network. The steepness of the status distribution, which has no influence on 
                                               
24
 In contrast to our procedure in the systematic simulation experiment, we abstain from presenting probabilities of 
decision change for high status partners. The reason is that in our experiment we assumed neither initial majorities nor 
correlation between preference and status, as is the case for our empirical data. The empirical circumstances result in in 
homogenous local neighbourhoods, which compromise the interpretation of a global probability of decision change in high 
status partners. 
25
 In turn this certainly implies the decrease of size of majority factions. 
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the contact behavior of the agents due to the contact rules we examined, played only 
a minor role with regard to the final distribution of preferences of the process. 
We also focused on the influence of low status agents on the preferences of 
high status agents. A change of preference of high status members was most 
probable when status played no role for contact behavior and hierarchies were flat. 
Given that the information of all neighbors was collected and integrated, a stronger 
influence of low status agents was obtained with a decreasing clustering, which again 
conforms to Latané & L’Herrou’s (1996) findings. 
Returning to our introductory considerations on member preferences as a 
basis for group decisions, our results imply a substantial impact of the information 
processing strategy on the group decision to be made. So does the consideration of 
high status for information search lead to a situation in which the formation of 
majorities becomes most probable, even if the communication network is clustered 
into cohesive subgroubs. These majorities still persist if committees, which are 
randomly selected from the group, are given the task of reaching a group decision. 
In line with the findings of Carley et al. (1998) we conclude that the interaction 
of agent cognition and structure of the multi-agent environment is an aspect which is 
central for the course of social processes. Furthermore, our work suggests that 
assuming parsimonious agent cognition is not only psychologically plausible, but in a 
multi-agent setting with a complex structure of interactions also has the prospect of 
resulting in rich collective behavior. This claim is well supported by research into the 
behavior of superorganisms (cf. Seeley 2001) and by recognized results from the 
study of processes on complex networks (cf. Newman 2003). Finally, our case study 
showed the model’s potential to guide and inform interventions on concrete real-
world processes. By variation of the assumed decision strategies we were able to 
produce an array of scenarios in which persistence of the minority faction was more 
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or less likely. With this knowledge at hand, it would, for instance, be conceivable to 
make expertise a salient category at the onset of some discussions. Given the 
situation of our specific example, this priming of status might well activate status 
sensitive information search. This in turn might eventually result in the otherwise 
unlikely persistence of the minority faction. We are convinced that our model may 
prove valuable for a wide range of organizational problems. 
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Chapter four: Evaluating Social Influence Relations: an 
Item-Response-Modeling Approach 
 
Abstract  
 
Subject of this paper is the measurement of social influence in social networks. The 
theoretical point of departure is twofold. First, focus is on cognitive processing of 
perceived influence. Second, three distinct dimensions of social influence are 
considered: persuasion, authority and coercion. Combining these considerations with 
Item Response Theory methods, questionnaire-type measurement instruments are 
proposed. These instruments are employed in a closed network case study where 
applicability is checked by means of network autocorrelation models. 
 
Introduction 
 
Measurement of social influence in closed networks has a long tradition which can be 
traced back to French’s “Formal Theory of Social Power” (French 1956). French & 
Raven’s (1959) considerations on “The Bases of Social Power” in a follow-up paper 
have become classics in modern social psychology. The question of how to model 
influence weights was also put forward before the background of network 
autocorrelation modeling. In this case the answers were prominently based on 
considerations about structural features of the network in focus (cf. Friedkin 1998, 
Leenders 2002).  
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In this paper we want to contribute to answering this question. We will employ an 
approach, which is cognitively oriented and relies on item response theory for direct 
measurement. The latter methods are very popular in educational assessment and 
have already been successfully applied to the subject of social capital by (van der 
Gaag & Snijders 2005). 
 
Social Influence and Cognition 
It is a prominent conception to view social influence as being “power in action”. 
Central to this conception is the idea that power is a more or less persistent relation 
between individuals, whose potential may be realized in certain situations. In this 
framework, power is based on the capacity of the powerful person to control the 
powerless person’s outcomes. However, there is discussion regarding the nature of 
the outcomes which are relevant for power processes 
(cf. Emerson 1981, Festinger 1950, French  & Raven 1959, Turner 1991). 
    
Despite the undoubted plausibility of this view, we want to conceptualize social 
influence in a different way. It seems to us that regardless of how strongly an 
influence relation is rooted in 
certain “bases of power”, its appreciation by the target person is a necessary 
condition for it to be effective. Therefore we would like to understand social influence 
as an instance of 
information processing rather than as an activity of “social forces”. 
    
This approach promises several advantages, as compared to the relational model of 
power. The first advantage is that focusing on cognition allows us to build more 
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elementary models of influence processes which highlight the causal assumptions 
held for the agents (viz. patients) of the influence system (cf. Schwenk 2006). The 
second advantage refers to the fact that attributes of elementary entities are often 
measured more easily than those of compound entities. 
    
We have discussed a cognitive model of social influence which is based on the idea 
of ecological rationality (cf. Gigerenzer et al. 1999)  in more detail elsewhere (see 
Schwenk & Reimer 2007), and only want to state a central assumption at this point. 
We assume that dyadic influence relations can be sensibly represented by a certain 
quantity which is attributed by the target person to the influence source. We expect 
such a quantity (it may be called the intensity of influence) to be key to the influence 
target’s consideration of the 
source, respectively for integration of influence-related information provided by 
several sources. In essence, we will frame social influence as a decision process, 
based on social cues and their perceived validities. 
    
In this paper we want to discuss a way to provide these ideas with operational 
content. Summarized, we will focus on measuring subjective evaluations of neighbor 
attributes in the respondent’s network. 
 
Modes of Social Influence 
Of course it is plausible to assume more than one dimension of influence to be 
effective. However, before the background of a cognitive model of social influence it 
might not suffice to just focus on the different bases of power as French & Raven 
(1959) do in their well-known paper of the same name. The reason is that, in addition 
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to power, we can imagine further neighbor attributes to be relevant for consideration 
and processing of communicated information. 
    
Concerning the qualities of social influence processes, we will start our attempt to the 
subject with Turner’s (2005) Three Process Theory of Power. Although we hold some 
reservations regarding this theory, it should be possible to clear them up, resulting in 
a viable approach to measuring social influence on the basis of a cognitive model. 
 
Turner’s Three Process Theory of Social Power 
(Turner 2005) names three core “processes” of social influence: persuasion, authority 
and coercion. In combination, these clearly exceed the concept of power, which can 
be related to the latter process of coercion. We want to add that Turner is not explicit 
with regard to the cognitive structure of those processes. On behalf of our purposes, 
we will proceed by identifying the capability to induce them with our mentioned 
dimensions of influence sources. 
    
Interestingly, Turner’s combination can be seen as joining major traditions of social 
psychology and sociology. We will discuss this after a short excursion to Turner’s 
view on power, which presents his admitted motivation to pool the three mentioned 
“processes”. 
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Power Over Both Volition and Action 
Turner (2005: pp.5) argues that traditional research, which defined power as the 
potential to exercise influence, has neglected the fact that power is exerted “through 
people” and not 
only “over people”. Hereby is obviously meant that power is not only a feature of an 
exerting agent, but itself needs to be processed “through” compliant persons who, in 
the end, act upon a given environment. In order to account for varying degrees of 
voluntary compliance which may be present during the exercise of “power through 
others”, Turner introduces the three mentioned modes of social influence. Obviously, 
coercion necessitates a lower amount of voluntary compliance, as compared to 
authority or even persuasion. 
    
In our opinion, Turner’s argumentation correctly refers to the aspect of processing of 
influence, but this could have been done more elegantly. The concept of “power 
through people” mixes the active and passive aspects of social influence. From the 
point of view of a cognitive approach, which focuses on consideration and the 
processing of influence, it is certainly possible to determine the receiving end 
respectively patient conditions under which an agent can exert influence. This 
renders a new concept of “power through people” unnecessary. 
    
Furthermore, by replacing the phrase “power through others” with “power over 
volition and action”, we might introduce a concept which also distinguishes between 
the three modes of influence on the basis of voluntary compliance. In our view, the 
attractiveness of such a concept would lie in the fact that it is both easily tractable 
and close to our personal experience.  
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Despite our criticism regarding the necessity of his new concept of power, we want to 
emphasize our position that Turner is convincingly right with his choice of what we 
like to call dimensions of social influence. We will sketch those subsequently with 
special attention to alternative derivations. 
 
Persuasion 
An obvious connection to Turner’s previous work is made by referring persuasion to 
the self-categorization-theory of social influence (Turner 1987). Here, social influence 
is identified as some kind of informational dependence, which is called “social reality 
validation”. A person is expected to be receptive to influence when she is unable to 
exert full control over a given task. In such a situation she will tend to socially validate 
the nature of the task. The degree of receptiveness is assumed to depend on the 
perceived similarity of the influence source to the person in focus. The linking 
assumption is that influence sources which are perceived as similar (belonging to the 
same “category”) should bear useful information for the task at hand. 
    
It should be noted, that by concentrating on mere individuals we deliberately depart 
from the standard use of this theory, which focuses directly on group behavior. 
 
Authority 
 
Turner (2005: p.11) defines authority analogous to what French  & Raven (1959) call 
“legitimate power”; namely as “the power to control in-group members because they 
are persuaded that it is right for a certain person to control them in certain matters”. 
As may be natural for a sociologist, the author would like to refer to Weber’s (1984) 
classical and largely congruent concept of “legitimate order”. 
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Coercion 
 
Coercion is defined by Turner (2005: pp.12) as being “the attempt to control a target 
against their will and self-interest through the deployment of human and material 
resources to constrain and manipulate their behavior”. Again following Weber (1984), 
we might extend “against the target’s will” towards “regardless of the target’s will”. 
    
As noted before, Turner (2005: pp.15) identifies coercion as being the “pragmatic 
power process in standard theory”. We basically agree with Turner in this point, but 
want to note that the degree to which a person may be voluntarily involved obviously 
depends on the type of outcome controlled by the powerful person. 
Item Wording 
 
We attempted to express the above considerations in the form of a questionnaire-
type instrument. A common idea underlying all item wordings is that they should 
reflect our cognitive interpretation of Turner’s theory and be situationally unspecific, in 
order to indicate persistent traits and allow broad application. 
    
Evaluation of a contact’s ability to persuade the respondent, as understood by self-
categorization theory, was handled as an exception. As mentioned above, 
persuasion has been decomposed into two separate concepts: informational 
dependence and perceived similarity. Unfortunately the former is strongly situation 
specific. We therefore developed an IRT-scale only for the situationally unspecific 
aspect of perceived similarity. In application, its measures can be used as weights for 
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a specially tailored evaluation of task- or situation specific informational dependence. 
The resulting product should yield a viable estimate of the perceived potential to 
persuade in the respective situation. In summary, the instruments subscales can be 
listed as follows: 
 
• Persuasion is measured by two subscales: 
 
o Perceived similarity focuses on the perceived helpfulness of a contact 
person regarding own problem coping.  
o Informational dependence is supposed to be measured tailor-made to 
the application, because of its situational specificity. 
 
• Authority focuses on the perception of rational and accepted authority of a 
contact person. 
• Coercion focuses on a contact person’s use of coercive means in everyday 
interaction. 
 
During the pretest, the respondents were presented 58 items in total, with 
approximately a third of them representing the item pool for an individual item set. 
Items were selected according to the results of a quantitative item analysis. Items 
were both expected to show an acceptable fit and to form an item set with easily 
intelligible semantics. The items selected for the three subscales considered are 
listed in Table 1. Responses were allowed to range on a five point agreement scale 
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Table 1: English translation of selected items (which were originally presented in German). The mean responses 
indicate the difficulty structure of the respective item set in the calibration sample. Agreement ranged on a 0-4 
scale, with “0” representing “I do not agree.” and “4” representing “I agree.”. 
Perceived Similarity   Mean Std. Dev. 
Item 1  This person has similar habits to me. 2.71 1.03 
Item 2 This person is someone who often faces the same 
problems as me. 
2.47 1.11 
Item 3 This person knows many people who face the same 
problems as me. 
1.80 1.10 
Authority       
Item 1 This person has gained valuable experience. 2.77 1.08 
Item 2 This person has accomplished much in her life, one 
should conform to her. 
1.85 0.98 
Item 3 I have often conformed to this person. 1.78 1.16 
Item 4 It is normal to conform to this person. 1.08 1.03 
Coercion       
Item 1 This person starts arguing if you have a different 
opinion. 
1.97 1.30 
Item 2 It may have consequences if you have a different 
opinion to this person. 
1.14 1.22 
Item 3 This person gets angry if you have a different 
opinion. 
0.59 0.99 
Item 4 This person will avoid me if I have a different 
opinion. 
0.38 0.83 
 
Measurement Model 
 
Taken together, we were interested in measuring the strength of beliefs about 
another person’s capability to induce influence over the above mentioned 
dimensions. We decided to employ an Item-Response-Theory (IRT) measurement 
model (cf. Embretson  & Reise 2000,  van der Linden  & Hambleton 1997) for several 
reasons. 
    
Firstly, IRT models allow the measurement of a latent trait on interval scale (as we 
assume by focusing on intensities), with only ordinal scaled observations given. This 
property is known as “conjoint measurement”. Secondly, since the estimation of 
latent traits is explicitly related to response patterns, scale values can be given a 
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rather “objective” interpretation, as compared to the standard procedure of assigning 
quantiles in a norm population. A third, and rather obvious advantage, as compared 
to factor analytic techniques, is that IRT models allow for skewed (and even 
dichotomous) response distributions. 
 
The Rasch Model 
 
The IRT’s fundamental principle is exemplified by the well known “Rasch Model” (cf. 
Embretson & Reise 2000: pp.65). Here both item and person are assumed to show 
differing degrees of intensity of the dimension to be measured. For example, some 
item could require a certain amount of perceived authority from a person in order to 
be agreed upon. Conversely, if the person fails to show this amount of authority, the 
item will not be agreed upon.  
    
In practice, one expresses a probabilistic version of this idea. The Rasch-Model is a 
member of the logit-family and models a response probability via a logistic function, 
whose parameters are dependent on the difference in intensity between item and 
personal trait. 
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),|1( ijijXP δθ=  is the probability of a positive response 1=ijX of person j to item i, 
given the latent person trait parameter jθ  and the latent item parameter iδ . This 
probability is dependent on the logit jθ , which is, as mentioned, simply the difference 
between those parameters. jθ  is often denoted as the “trait level” or “ability” and  iδ  
as „item difficulty“. 
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Essentially, the Rasch-Model has two fundamental assumptions. The first is 
obviously that the dependence between trait level and response probability can be 
described by a sigmoid-curve. The second assumption is about the local conditional 
independence of the items given the latent parameters. This implies that all 
correlation between the items must possibly be explained by the difference of the 
latent parameters jθ  and iδ . 
    
Since in the Rasch-Model the parameters of interest are latent, they have to be 
inferred abductively. This can be accomplished by the employment of several 
maximum-likelihood methods (cf. van der Linden/Hambleton 1996) or the MCMC-
simulation of their a-posterori distribution (cf. Gilks et al. 1995). 
    
Assessment of individual persons during application of a calibrated Rasch-Model (or 
one of it’s derivates) is done by estimation of their trait level with fixed item difficulties. 
These fixed values of the item parameters have to be obtained beforehand by an 
appropriate calibration sample. 
 
Employed Polytomous IRT-Models 
 
Two models have been applied to data in the actual measurement task. Both are 
extensions of the Rasch-model for polytomous data and share its features and basic 
interpretation. 
 
The Partial-Credit-Model (PCM) 
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The “Partial-Credit-Model” focuses on modeling the probability of a response to the 
particular higher of two adjacent categories. So to speak, an individual Rasch-Model 
is estimated for every threshold between the neighboring categories of a polytomous 
item. The Partial-Credit-Model can be written as follows. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The target quantity is now the probability ),...,,|( 1 imijij xXP δδθ=  of person j scoring 
category x to item i, conditional on the person trait level jθ  and the difficulties ikδ  of 
the item i´s m category thresholds. For a more detailed explanation, we would like to 
refer the reader to Masters & Wright (1997). 
 
The Rating-Scale-Model (RSM) 
 
The Rating-Scale-Model is an important special case of the Partial-Credit-Model, 
which assumes the same structure of distances between the threshold difficulties 
ikδ for all items ],...,2,1[ si ∈ . This is usually a reasonable assumption when the item 
set shares a common response format. The model can be written as follows. 
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Again, the target quantity is the probability ),...,,,|( 1 mijij xXP δδλθ=  of person j 
scoring category x on item i, but now it is conditional on both the person trait level jθ , 
the common difficulties kδ  of the item i´s m category thresholds and an additional 
item-location parameter iλ . This latter parameter adjusts the common threshold 
structure to the particular item. For detailed discussion, the reader is referred to 
(Anderson 1997). 
    
Due to its restricted threshold structure, the Rating-Scale-Model is not as flexible as 
the Partial-Credit-Model. This may be a shortcoming if the data indicates 
considerable threshold variation.  On the other hand, it should avoid over-fitting better 
than its more complex relative. 
 
Instrument Development  
 
It has been our aim to develop scales for assessment of social influence in closed 
social networks. It is plausible to assume the existence of nodes with a rather high 
degree in such a context. In order to facilitate economic data collection, we decided 
to develop scales which contain only a few items. These would need to be presented 
repeatedly to the respondents, once for every one of their neighbors. 
    
The eventually small size of the networks in which the measurement instruments 
should be applied also posed a restriction to our task. It is not likely that such a small 
network would show enough variance in responses in order to allow the simultaneous 
estimation of both item- and person parameters. We therefore decided to prepare 
instruments which can be applied in a stepwise procedure. In a first step, we 
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developed and calibrated the instruments in a survey setting, with an abundance of 
responses. In a second step, we employed the instruments, with now readily 
calibrated item parameters, for evaluation of individual responses in a closed network 
setting. 
 
Survey Setting 
 
Development and calibration of scales in a survey setting necessitated some 
considerations to allow application in a closed network setting. The critical point is 
that in a sampled survey, respondents can not be expected to be connected at all. 
We therefore decided to ask the respondents to evaluate a member of their personal 
network. 
    
More precisely, the respondents were asked to complete a list with (up to) seven 
persons that they have contact with outside their family. Then one person from the 
list was drawn at random, employing a method similar to the familiar „Kish-Selection-
Grid“ (Kish 1965). The items that were subsequently presented then referred to this 
randomly selected person, measuring in fact their perceived influence on the 
respondent. 
    
Our consideration concerning the listing of contact persons and subsequent 
randomized selection, had been to avoid developing a scale of “best friends 
influence”. We assumed that persons, who are salient in memory are likely to be 
those assigned with strong and presumably positive emotions. By asking the 
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respondents to name seven contacts, we hoped to trigger sufficient cognitive activity 
to overcome this tendency. 
 
Samples 
We collected data on two occasions, the first time for pretest and the second time for 
calibration from the student population at the social science department at a German 
university. 
    
The pretest data was collected in an advanced statistics class and consisted of 63 
cases: 68.3 % of the respondents were female and 31.7 % male. 
    
Calibration data was collected at an inter-department lecture on introductory 
sociology, which is commonly attended by social science students and students who 
are studying to become teachers. On this occasion 352 cases were collected with the 
gender distribution being 73.6 % female and 26.4 % male. 
 
Instrument Stability 
The ordinality structure of selected items remained constant from the pretest to the 
calibration sample, together with the general structure of item fit. 
    
The only major change was observed in the “coercion” item set. In the calibration 
sample, mean responses for all its items dropped approximately one agreement-
category on a five category scale, indicating a lower total level of reported coercion. 
We have put this change down to environmental effects. The pretest had been 
collected after a rather unpopular evening lecture in statistics. However, the 
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calibration sample was collected after the students had been told that the rest of the 
day’s introductory lecture would be canceled. We believe that these different levels of 
experienced “coercion” are mirrored in the data. 
 
Calibration 
In this section, we will discuss the properties of our calibrated scales such as 
threshold structure and item fit. Our considerations will concentrate on the so called 
“infit mean squares”. This value measures the proportion of observed to expected 
variance, with a value of 1 indicating perfect fit and complete local conditional 
independence. High infit-values (> 1.33) indicate that only an insufficient proportion of 
variance can be explained by the model. This may suggest that the assumption of 
local conditional independence is not met, implicating the presence of different data-
generating processes. Low infit-values (< 0.66) also indicate misfit of the model, 
namely that items show a higher discriminatory power than expected. Being certainly 
suboptimal, this kind of lack of fit may however be tolerable. 
    
Furthermore, we computed both Partial-Credit and Rating-Scale models and decided 
for one alternative according to an analysis of Akaike’s (AIC) and Schwartz’ 
Information Criteria (BIC). Both are aimed at a comparison of nested models while 
controlling for a tendency of 
overfitting, which is inherent in models of increasing complexity. This is accomplished 
by adding a complexity penalty term to the model’s deviance, indicating that the 
model with the lower information criterion is preferable. The complexity penalty of 
Akaike’s Criterion is higher than that of Schwartz’ Criterion. 
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Scale I: Persuasion / Perceived Similarity 
The scale on perceived similarity consists of the following items: 
 
• Item 1: „This person has similar habits to me.“ 
• Item 2: „This person is someone who often faces the same problems as me.“ 
• Item 3: „This person knows many people who face the same problems as me.“ 
 
Model Selection 
 
As shown in Table 2, the Likelihood Ratio-Test (LR=14.21; df=3; α< 0.005) indicates 
that the Partial Credit Model fits the perceived similarity item set significantly better 
than the Rating Scale Model. Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) prefers the Partial 
Credit Model, while Schwartz’ Information Criterion (BIC) prefers the Rating Scale 
Model. Since the recommendations of the information criteria are conflicting, we 
decided to err on the side of simplicity and chose the more parsimonious Rating 
Scale Model for this item set. 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Information criteria and Likelihood-Ratio-tests for the competing measurement models, based on 
calibration sample data. Two stars (**) indicate that the LR-Test is significant on a level (α < .005). 
Item Set Model 1 Model 2 AIC(M1) AIC(M2) BIC(M1) BIC(M2) LR 
Perceived 
Similarity 
Rating 
Scale 
Partial 
Credit 
2884.02 2875.82 2903.29 2906.66 14.24** 
Authority Rating 
Scale 
Partial 
Credit 
3742.09 3728.86 3765.10 3771.01 23.27** 
Coercion Rating 
Scale 
Partial 
Credit 
3253.32 3220.75 3276.41 3263.09 42.57** 
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Scale Properties 
 
Table 3 shows the scales threshold structure, whose regularity stems from 
application of the Rating Scale Model. As can be seen from the infit-values in Table 
3, a single item (item 2, “This person is someone who often faces the same problems 
as me.”) shows considerably higher discriminatory power (i.e. lower variance) than 
expected under the Rating Scale Model. However, for the sake of consistent 
semantics, we decided to leave the item in the set. The remaining two items show 
rather good infit values. 
 
Table 3: Rating Scale Model for Perceived Similarity: Item Difficulties & Common Threshold Difficulties 
Item Estimate Error Infit MnSq 
1 -0.530 0.045 1.21 
2 -0.187 0.044 0.70 
3  0.717 - - 
Threshold Estimate Error Infit MnSq 
1 -1.122 0.077 1.17 
2 -1.158 0.069 1.11 
3  0.677 0.072 0.97 
4 1.603 - - 
 
Scale II: Authority 
The scale for Authority consists of the following items: 
• Item 1: “This person has gained valuable experience.” 
• Item 2: “This person has accomplished much in her life, one should conform to 
her.” 
• Item 3: “I have often conformed to this person.” 
• Item 4: “It is normal to conform to this person.” 
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Model Selection 
 
Again the Partial Credit Model fits significantly better than the Rating Scale Model, as 
indicated by a Likelihood Ratio-Test (LR=23.27; df=5; α< 0.00). However, 
consultation of the information criteria is again inconclusive, since AIC prefers the 
Partial Credit Model and BIC prefers the Rating Scale Model, as is shown in Table 4. 
For the sake of simplicity, we again decided to employ the Rating Scale Model for the 
Authority item set. 
 
Scale Properties 
 
Table 4 shows thresholds and item fit of the authority scale. The items of the scale 
can be regarded as well-fitting, since all infit values show only reasonable departure 
from a perfect fit. 
 
Table 4: Rating Scale Model for Authority: Item Difficulties & Common Threshold Difficulties 
Item Estimate Error Infit MnSq 
1 -1.093 0.045 1.22 
2  0.012 0.043 0.84 
3  0.095 0.043 0.96 
4  0.987 - - 
Threshold Estimate Error Infit MnSq 
1 -1.307 0.065 1.14 
2 -0.714 0.059 1.06 
3  0.791 0.074 0.92 
4  1.231 - - 
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Scale III: Coercion 
 
Coercion is measured by the following items: 
• Item 1: “This person starts arguing, if you have a different opinion.” 
• Item 2: “It may have some sort of consequence, if I have a different opinion to 
that person.” 
• Item 3: “This person gets angry, if you have a different opinion.” 
• Item 4: “This person will possibly avoid me, if I have a different opinion.” 
 
Model Selection 
 
As before, a Likelihood Ratio-Test (LR=42.57; df=5; α< 0.005) shows that the Partial 
Credit Model fits significantly better than the Rating Scale Model (compare Table 2). 
Consultation of the information criteria indicates that the Partial Credit Model is 
indeed preferable, since both AIC and BIC show a minimum value for this model. 
 
Scale Properties 
 
The threshold structure and item fit of the Coercion scale is given in Table 5. It can 
be seen that the thresholds of the individual items are contracting with increasing 
mean difficulty. This decrease of discriminatory power can again be interpreted as 
corresponding with a decline in the respondent’s willingness (or ability) to provide 
unbiased responses. Again we assume that the extremity of the items is the reason 
for the observation of these response patterns in our calibration sample. 
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Item fit can be regarded as generally good for this scale. All but one of the infit values 
are in a reasonable range around 1. The third item (“This person gets angry, if you 
have a different opinion.”) shows a rather low infit value, indicating that its 
discriminatory power has been underestimated. Being a tolerable feature, we decided 
to leave the item in the item set of the scale. 
 
Table 5: Partial Credit Model for Coercion: Threshold Difficulties 
Threshold Estimate Error Infit MnSq 
Item 1    
1.1 -1.921 0.121 1.05 
1.2 -1.210 0.113 1.01 
1.3 -0.338 0.144 0.99 
1.4 -0.287 - - 
Item 2    
2.1 -0.826 0.114 1.01 
2.2 -0.146 0.134 0.95 
2.3  0.067 0.192 0.92 
2.4  0.293 - - 
Item 3    
3.1 0.323 0.124 0.93 
3.2 0.091 0.170 0.91 
3.3 0.839 0.301 0.91 
3.4 0.287 - - 
Item 4    
4.1  0.823 0.139 0.97 
4.2  0.911 0.222 1.03 
4.3 -0.005 0.305 1.00 
4.4  1.099 - - 
 
Application in a Network Setting 
 
Unfortunately rigorous validation of the scales in the sense of criterion validation of a 
survey instrument has been infeasible. The reason is that in the case of our subject 
of social influence, we cannot simply look for features that correlate with our 
measurements. Instead we need to look for the effects of a composite of influence 
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measures and communication structures, because we assume that individuals 
employ evaluations of social influence in order to consider and integrate information 
from a possible array of sources. This clearly implies that the instruments cannot be 
validated by means other than a closed network study, where there is a known 
communication structure. 
Network Autocorrelation Model 
 
In order to get information about the joint effect of influences in a closed network 
setting, we decided to check our scales using a Network Autocorrelation Model 
(NACM). This class of regression models originates from spatial statistics (Anselin 
1988) and has been discussed with regard to network application by Leenders 
(2002). For cross-sectional data the model can be written as follows. 
 
eBXWYY ++= ρ  
 
Y  indicates a dependent attribute vector and WY  the so called “network 
autocorrelation term”, where the vector of the dependent attribute Y is multiplied by a 
matrix of influence weights W . The scalar ρ and the elements of the vector B are the 
regression coefficients of the model which estimate the relative impact of the network 
autocorrelation term and the matrix of exogenous predictors X . e represents the 
stochastic error term of the model. 
    
Applied to our problem, ρ  indicates the effect of a social influence structure, as 
evaluated by our proposed measurement instruments, on a particular attitude 
variable. Analysis of such a model in a case study, with special attention to explained 
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variance and fit, should lead to valuable conclusions regarding the applicability of our 
instruments.  
 
Unfortunately we can not rule out a possible bias towards validity, namely that 
evaluations of communication partners are themselves subject to social influence. 
We abstained from constructing NACMs to explain neighbor evaluations, since this 
seemed unpromising in terms of the expected data base. It would have been 
necessary to set up a particular NACM for every person in the network, each based 
only on the probably small number of her direct neighbors. 
 
Case Study 
 
We collected data from a group of professors and assistants at two German 
universities who collaborated in order to apply for a grant from the German Science 
Foundation. The subject of their application was the field of “Evidence Based Policy”. 
    
The core group, who both officially applied for the grant and actively participated in 
internal communication, consisted of 13 persons. Obvious features were distributed 
as follows over the group: 
 
• Ten persons worked at one university (subsequently called “University A”) and 
three persons at the other (subsequently called “University B”). 
• Eleven persons were male and two were female. 
• Eleven persons were professors and two were assistants (including the project 
coordinator). 
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• Six persons were social scientists, five psychologists and two business 
economists. 
 
In order to collect data from this group, we invited its members to participate in an 
online survey. In this survey, respondents were asked about their attitudes towards 
various aspects of the project, as well as their communication pattern and their 
evaluation of their contacts according to our social influence scales. After a field time 
of five weeks we were able to gather data from eleven of the 13 group members. 
 
Measurements 
 
We decided to employ the respondent’s evaluation of qualitative methods (with 
regard to their utility for evidence-based policy) as the dependent variable (DV) of the 
model, since it showed considerable variance. We furthermore chose a single 
predictor variable (IV), the respondent’s evaluation of structural equation modeling 
(again with regard to their utility for evidence-based policy). This variable had been 
chosen because of its good correlation (r=0.308) with the dependent variable. Both 
variables had been measured by a single item on a seven point scale (“1” 
representing “negative” and “7” representing “positive”). 
 
• DV item: “How do you evaluate qualitative methods with regard to their utility 
for evidence-based policy and practice?” ( x =5.73, sd=1.49, n=11) 
• IV item: „How do you evaluate structural equation modeling with regard to it“s 
utility for evidence based policy and practice?“ ( x =5.73, sd=1.35, n=11) 
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In order get a context specific measure of informational dependence, respondents 
were asked about their familiarity with qualitative methods, the attitude object of the 
dependent variable in focus. This variable was also measured by a single item on a 
seven point scale (“1” representing “I do not feel familiar.” and “7” representing “I do 
feel familiar.”). 
 
• Informational dependence item: “How familiar do you feel with qualitative 
methods?” ( x =4.27, sd=2.28, n=11) 
 
The evaluations of interaction partners was collected using our three proposed 
measurement instruments. The inferred trait parameters were allowed to vary 
between -6 and 6 logits and were subsequently standardized for application. The 
values for persuasion were calculated by multiplication of the standardized trait 
parameters of perceived similarity with the standardized measurements of 
informational dependence. By this we tried to express the conditionality inherent to 
self categorization theory. (Perceived similarity only makes a difference if people 
need to depend on others in a task.) Altogether, the following measurements have 
been made on social influence. 
 
• Persuasion scale ( x =0.26, sd=0.03, nevaluations=37) 
• Authority scale ( x =0.62, sd=0.15, nevaluations =37) 
• Coercion scale ( x =0.36, sd=0.05, nevaluations =37) 
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Influence Networks 
 
Our measurements of evaluation of interaction partners yielded the directed networks 
given in Tables 6 – 9 and Figure 1). In order to provide the network autocorrelation 
model with appropriate input, the adjacency matrices have been transposed, thus 
converting subjective evaluations into properly directed influences. We furthermore 
set the diagonal of the adjacency matrices to unity in order to allow for maximum “self 
influence”. 
 
Table 6: Observed adjacency matrix, values set to unity 
 1 
Psychologist 
2 
Sociologist 
(Uni B) 
"3 
Sociologist 
4 
Business 
Economist 
(Ass.)  
5 
Business 
Economist 
6 
Sociologist 
(Uni B) 
7 
Sociologist 
8 
Sociologist 
9 
Psychologist             
10 
Sociologist 
(Ass.) 
11 
Psychologist 
(Uni B)  
1 
Psychologist 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 
2 
Sociologist 
(Uni B) 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 
3 
Sociologist 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
4 Business 
Economist 
(Ass.) 
0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5 Business 
Economist 
0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 
6 
Sociologist 
(Uni B) 
0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 
7 
Sociologist 
0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 
8 
Sociologist 
1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 
9 
Psychologist 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 
10 
Sociologist 
(Ass.) 
1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 
11 
Psychologist 
(Uni B) 
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 
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Table 7: Observed adjacency matrix, values as measured by persuasion instrument, receiving agent in columns 
 1 
Psychologist 
2 
Sociologist 
(Uni B) 
"3 
Sociologist 
4 
Business 
Economist 
(Ass.)  
5 
Business 
Economist 
6 
Sociologist 
(Uni B) 
7 
Sociologist 
8 
Sociologist 
9 
Psychologist             
10 
Sociologist 
(Ass.) 
11 
Psychologist 
(Uni B)  
1 
Psychologist 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.188 0.463 0 0 
2 
Sociologist 
(Uni B) 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0.167 0 0.029 0.519 
3 
Sociologist 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0.188 0 0 0 
4 Business 
Economist 
(Ass.) 
0 0 0 1 0.143 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5 Business 
Economist 
0 0 0 0.210 1 0 0.383 0.188 0 0 0 
6 
Sociologist 
(Uni B) 
0 0.049 0.098 0 0 1 0.357 0.167 0 0.029 0.451 
7 
Sociologist 
0 0 0.087 0 0.203 0 1 0.167 0 0 0 
8 
Sociologist 
0.670 0.049 0.098 0 0.264 0 0.322 1 0.558 0.024 0.483 
9 
Psychologist 
0.341 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.127 1 0 0 
10 
Sociologist 
(Ass.) 
0.410 0 0.078 0.196 0.203 0 0 0.188 0 1 0 
11 
Psychologist 
(Uni B) 
0.4103 0.049 0 0 0 0 0 0.208 0.524 0 1 
 
Table 8: Observed adjacency matrix, values as measured by authority instrument, receiving agent in columns 
 1 
Psychologist 
2 
Sociologist 
(Uni B) 
"3 
Sociologist 
4 
Business 
Economist 
(Ass.)  
5 
Business 
Economist 
6 
Sociologist 
(Uni B) 
7 
Sociologist 
8 
Sociologist 
9 
Psychologist             
10 
Sociologist 
(Ass.) 
11 
Psychologist 
(Uni B)  
1 
Psychologist 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.653 0.440 0 0 
2 
Sociologist 
(Uni B) 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0.653 0 0.999 0.882 
3 
Sociologist 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0.653 0 0 0 
4 Business 
Economist 
(Ass.) 
0 0 0 1 0.403 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5 Business 
Economist 
0 0 0 0.488 1 0 0.0005 0.569 0 0 0 
6 
Sociologist 
(Uni B) 
0 0.871 0.941 0 0 1 0.502 0.653 0 0.999 0.882 
7 
Sociologist 
0 0 0.788 0 0.713 0 1 0.760 0 0 0 
8 
Sociologist 
0.999 0.0005 0.941 0 0.784 0 0.219 1 0.765 0.999 0.991 
9 
Psychologist 
0.536 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.653 1 0 0 
10 
Sociologist 
(Ass.) 
0.0005 0 0.732 0.488 0.4957 0 0 0.760 0 1 0 
11 
Psychologist 
(Uni B) 
0.536 0.0005 0 0 0 0 0 0.993 0.634 0 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 124
Table 9: Observed adjacency matrix, values as measured by coercion instrument, receiving agent in columns 
 1 
Psychologist 
2 
Sociologist 
(Uni B) 
"3 
Sociologist 
4 
Business 
Economist 
(Ass.)  
5 
Business 
Economist 
6 
Sociologist 
(Uni B) 
7 
Sociologist 
8 
Sociologist 
9 
Psychologist             
10 
Sociologist 
(Ass.) 
11 
Psychologist 
(Uni B)  
1 
Psychologist 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.442 0.309 0 0 
2 
Sociologist 
(Uni B) 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0.419 0 0.217 0.0005 
3 
Sociologist 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0.361 0 0 0 
4 Business 
Economist 
(Ass.) 
0 0 0 1 0.501 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5 Business 
Economist 
0 0 0 0.578 1 0 0.464 0.442 0 0 0 
   0 0.368 0.557 0 0 1 0.501 0.442 0 0.310 0.0005 
7 
Sociologist 
0 0 0.557 0 0.420 0 1 0.462 0 0 0 
8 
Sociologist 
0.222 0.309 0.538 0 0.394 0 0.443 1 0.216 0.310 0.0005 
9 
Psychologist 
0.465 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.419 1 0 0 
10 
Sociologist 
(Ass.) 
0.501 0 0.519 0.395 0.361 0 0 0.394 0 1 0 
11 
Psychologist 
(Uni B) 
0.366 0.217 0 0 0 0 0 0.419 0.216 0 1 
 
 
 
Figure 1 Unlabeled Influence Network 
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Model Results 
 
We fitted several models to the data, using maximum likelihood estimation. All 
models had the evaluation of qualitative methods as their dependent variable. The 
baseline model was an ordinary bivariate regression model with the evaluation of 
structural equation modeling as its independent variable. Our extended models 
contained an additional network autocorrelation term, each model with a differently 
valued adjacency matrix. A first model contained the surveyed adjacency matrix with 
values set to unity. Three further models contained the surveyed adjacency matrix, 
each with values measured by the instruments on persuasion, authority, and 
coercion. A last model contained a complete adjacency matrix with values set to 
unity. Estimations are given in Table 10 
 
Table 10: Fitted network autocorrelation models, dependent variable is evaluation of qualitative methods 
Model IV AC Matrix Network 
Effect ρ  
Sig.
ρ  
IV 
Effect β 
Sig. β R2 LL LR ( to 
Basel.) 
Sig LR 
Baseline SEM - - - 0.969 0.000 0.382 -20,67 - - 
Unity SEM Unity 0.068 0.012 0.676 0.000 0.454 -18.34 4.66 < 0.050 
Persusasion SEM Persuasion 0.283 0.003 0.486 0.05 0.484 -17.46 6.42 < 0.010 
Authority SEM Authority 0.097 0.006 0.681 0.000 0.468 -18.02 5.30 < 0.025 
Coercion SEM Coercion 0.194 0.003 0.546 0.000 0.4147 -19.49 2.36 > 0.1 
 
 
The baseline model shows a strong effect of evaluation of structural equation 
modeling on the evaluation of qualitative methods, and a considerable proportion of 
explained variance. When the surveyed adjacency matrix, with values set to unity, 
was entered into the equation, we observed a small effect of network autocorrelation. 
The effect of structural equation modeling dropped considerably, while the proportion 
of explained variance rose by over 0.08. 
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When the surveyed adjacency matrix with values measured by the persuasion 
instrument was entered for the autocorrelation term, we observed a much stronger 
network effect, an even weaker effect of evaluation of structural equation modeling 
and a proportion of explained variance which exceeded the one of the baseline 
model by over 0.1. 
    
Compared to the model containing the observed adjacency matrix set to unity, the 
model containing the authority matrix showed similar behavior. The network 
autocorrelation effect was weak, the effect of the evaluation of the structural equation 
model was considerably lower and the proportion of explained variance was 
considerably higher than in the baseline model. However, knowledge of the 
distribution of perceived authority did not yield improved results, as compared to the 
case, when only the barren structure of communication was known. 
  
The model containing measured evaluations of coercive behavior showed a 
considerable network effect and an accordingly lower effect of evaluation of structural 
equation modeling. Although its proportion of explained variance exceeded the 
baseline model by approx. 0.03, it was approx. 0.04 lower than in the model with the 
adjacency matrix values set to unity. Furthermore, a likelihood ratio test indicated no 
significantly improved fit as compared to the baseline model.  
   
All other models containing a network autocorrelation term, but the coercion model, 
were superior compared to the baseline model, as indicated by likelihood ratio tests. 
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Implications for Validity 
 
Summarized, our estimations show improved predictions for the case of the 
persuasion instrument. The instrument on authority did not improve predictive 
performance in our case study, while the coercion instrument yielded new predictions 
but did not fit well. This clearly suggests the validity of the persuasion instrument. 
However, the result does not necessarily strip the other two instruments of potential 
validity. 
    
The reason is that in a setting of professors it is quite plausible to assume persuasion 
to be more important than authority and coercion not fitting well. Given the small size 
and specific culture of our network, the small effect and inferior fit of the latter 
measurements can not necessarily be generalized. It should make sense to expect 
different patterns under different circumstances. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In summary, we developed three instruments to measure the subjective evaluations 
of a communication partner’s potential to induce influence. Following a cognitive 
reinterpretation of Turner’s Three Process Theory of Power, we proposed 
persuasion, authority and coercion to be the relevant dimensions of social influence. 
We decided to employ IRT-methods in the form of partial-credit and rating-scale 
models as measurement rationale. In order to yield readily calibrated item 
parameters for application of the instruments in a closed network setting we 
developed scales in a survey setting. The calibrated models were then applied in a 
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closed network study about communication and attitudes in an academic setting. The 
application of a network autocorrelation model to the case study’s data showed a 
substantive predictive gain for the case of the persuasion measures, but only 
negligible predictive gain in the case of the authority measures and inferior fit in the 
case of the coercion measures. This supports our claim of validity for the persuasion 
scale. Although this claim has not been supported for the other scales, it can, 
however, not be refuted by the case study. It is plausible to assume that authority and 
coercion should have only minor effects in an academic setting. Investigation on 
these scales should therefore proceed using data from a different area. 
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Conclusion 
 
After presenting the core chapters of the work, I now want to provide the reader with 
a concluding summary, a discussion of the achievements made and an outlook 
towards possible follow-up research. 
    As stated in the introduction, the aim of this dissertation has been to develop 
methodological foundations and actual methods which enable explanation of 
collective behavior via individual behavior. As it has been exemplified in the core 
chapters of the present work, this is by no means a trivial task. The productivity of 
such an account depends on successful contributions in an array of related fields: 
ontology, modeling methodology, social psychology, computational inference and 
finally measurement models. In order to put the contributions made into a common 
frame, the individual chapters will be reviewed subsequently. The summaries of the 
individual chapters are varying in their amount of detail, depending on the complexity 
of the respective argumentation. The summary of chapter one will be most detailed, 
while the other, more technical chapters will be treated more cursory. This aims at 
sparing mathematical and technical detail in order to present the respective chapter´s 
argumentative structure.  
 
Chapter one 
 
Chapter one ("Interlevel relations and manipulative causality") dealt with the 
philosophy of level-transitory statements. Reaching beyond the practice of consulting 
philosophy only in its subfield of epistemology, it discussed primarily ontological 
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questions. These questions were focused upon the relation between the concepts of 
causality and level and, derived from this, the concepts of reduction and emergence. 
 
A focal point has been the identification of an object, since the proposal of a level 
depends on the identification of the levels respective elements. In order to avoid a 
materialistic account on the status of reality of level and object, causal structure has 
been introduced as criterion of identification. As a consequence it has been 
necessary to discuss the notion of causality, which is one of the most ambivalent 
concepts of philosophy. In this course a concept has been adopted, which defines a 
causal relation as a relation which is determined by a lawful and productive 
connection of properties. The two components, lawfulness and productivity, have 
immediate epistemological implications. Productivity can be associated with 
manipulative action, which is a primary means for an observer to isolate a 
mechanism of interest and identify its conditions and consequences. The concept of 
lawful connection however raises another serious problem, namely how some lawful 
relation can be induced from observation. In fashion similar to proposing the subject-
centered concept of action as a means for identifying causal productivity, the problem 
of induction has been treated in a minor, subjective form. In particular it may suffice 
to concentrate on the most rational inferences on lawful relations, without necessarily 
proposing these inferences to be concordant to some hidden reality. Of course, this 
subject-centered, resp. constructive treatment lowers the degree of generality of the 
answers to be expected. Nevertheless it has been possible to show that such an 
approach provides productive results for the problem in focus. 
    In order to combine the aspects of an isolating structure of mechanisms and 
manipulative causality, we proposed the calculus of causal bayesian networks (Pearl 
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2000) as a both intuitive and productive means of representing the proposed 
ontology of structural causality. 
    Based on these considerations it has been possible to refine the relation between 
the concepts of object and level. The idea of structural causality implies that objects 
are defined by a network of causal relations. This in turn straightforwardly allows to 
identify a level by the set of all causally connected objects. Starting from this concept, 
a specific hierarchy of levels may be declared based on a possible aggregation of 
mechanisms. The latter proposal does not imply that the choice of the granularity of 
such an aggregation may be arbitrary. Again relying on a subject-centered argument, 
it has been stated that some aggregation of mechanisms may be more easily 
declared than others, depending on the effort needed to conceive or actually 
accomplish action.  An aggregate mechanism may easily be declared if some joint of 
elementary mechanisms has a structure, wich results in its relative environmental 
autonomy. Self-regulating and self-organizing structures are joints of mechanisms of 
this type, on which an aggregate mechanism may easily be declared. 
 
After discussion of the basic notions of the approach, chapter one concentrated on 
the formulation of relations between different levels of aggregation. The problem can 
be summarized by the term of logical realization. Hereby is meant that higher order 
objects are per definition joints of mechanisms, since without declaration of a fine 
granular micro-level, talk of aggregation and higher level properties would make no 
sense. A further proposal that activity on the lower level does not stop once a higher 
level is declared, leads to the proposition that lower level activity logically realizes 
activity on the higher level. However, this does not mean, that the lower level is 
"more real" than the higher one, since declaration could start with arbitrary 
granularity, provided manipulative causality applies to it. This has consequences in 
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the following respect. Elements on some level are obviously completely determined 
by processes going on on this level, this conclusion being a tautology of the definition 
of level as the set of all causally affiliated objects. A result of this conclusion is, that 
relations between different levels are causally inert, since a causal claim for level 
transitory relations would immediately lead to causal over-determination of the lower 
level, which provides the most detailed description of a system. Furthermore, the 
closely related notion of supervenience has been discussed. According to Kim 
(1998), it can be defined by the concept of micro-indiscernibility: "For any x and y, 
belonging to level L . . ., if x and y are indiscernible in relation to properties at all 
levels lower than L . . ., then x and y are indiscernible with respect to all properties at 
level L." (Kim, 1998, p. 17) Consequently, properties on level L supervene on 
properties on lower levels. This concept is in accordance with the approach 
advocated above. However it is, as Kim states, only a phenomenological theory 
which is about patterns of covariance and not about "deeper dependence relations" 
(Kim, 1998, p. 15), as they are proposed in my own approach. After discussion of the 
detailed interlevel relations implied by my approach, chapter one dealt with the 
concepts of reduction and emergence and discussed some quite popular viewpoints. 
The first position to be mentioned has been those of ontological reductionism, which 
seems to be broad common sense in the natural sciences. Its basic claim is that the 
lower level objects obviously share a material reality, which is not owned by the 
higher level compounds, which can be described as structures of this lower level 
objects. A consequence of this view is that only the smallest particles conceivable are 
considered to be "real". The following objection has been risen against this approach. 
It seems that it is merely a method to decrement the level of explanation which does 
not include a criterion to stop this process of always referring to a lower level. The 
reason is that it is always possible to conceive a more detailed lower level for 
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explanation, given that the answers provided on some levels are not completely 
satisfactory. A further position discussed has been that of nomological reductionism, 
which is prominent in the social sciences (c.f Esser 1996, Opp 2005). Here the idea 
is to convert different theories into each other via conjecturing so called bridge 
hypotheses. Theories operating on different levels are only seen as instances of this 
general scheme. The most important argument against this view has been the 
following. Since the implicit ontology of nomological reductionism does neither care 
about causality nor objects, it violates the conditions of identity of the latter ones, if 
applied to level transitory applications. Declaration of bridge hypotheses immediately 
results in causal over-determination of the lower level. Level transitory statements 
need to be inferred from the given levels and not be added to them, in order to 
prevent violation of the lower level objects identity. Finally, some remarks on the 
counterpart of reduction, emergence, have been made. Most prominently, the claim 
of the impossibility of explanation of emergent properties has been objected, since 
this is a per fiat statement. Weak emergentism, which allows backtracking higher 
level properties to lower levels is an alternative to this, which is advocated throughout 
chapter one. 
 
Chapter two 
 
The second chapter ("Probabilistic inference for actor centered models") dealt with 
application of the results yielded in chapter one. Its objective is to build a productive 
methodology based on the ontological system previously developed. 
    Starting point has been a short review of the ontological results made, which 
developed into a discussion of how objects and their separating set of mechanisms 
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are represented in different modeling formalisms. The formalisms considered were 
agent based modeling, system theory and probabilistic graphical models. They have 
in common that they perform inference on global system behavior from a local 
formulation of element behavior and the elements´ structure of interdependence. 
Agent-based-modeling has been discussed first. Here elementary objects are 
separated from their environment by a technique which is called information hiding. 
An object is seen as a container of properties, the states of which are "hidden" from 
other objects. These other objects can access or alter the focal objects´ states 
only via a predefined interface. Recurring to the idea of isolation by a structure of 
mechanisms one can say that the interface provides the mechanistic relations 
between the focal object and its environment. The second formalism which has been 
discussed is system theory. It can be regarded as a variety of the theory of systems 
of differential equations. System elements are represented as operator functions, 
which transform some input into output over time and whose interconnections form 
the system´s structure of interdependence. The formalism of systems theory does not 
focus on the concept of object identity, except for the higher level object which is the 
system as a whole. This is identified by its boundary, namely the set of all modeled 
processes. Despite its focus on the macro object, systems theory is a powerful tool 
for inference of global behavior. The third formalism to be discussed was probability 
theory in form of bayesian networks. Here component behavior can be defined in 
terms of conditional probability statements, which as a whole define a joint probability 
distribution. From this joint distribution (or the equivalent graph of conditional 
statements) probability statements about subsets of the respective local variables 
can be projected. This amounts to deriving collective statements from individualistic 
formulation. An advantageous feature of probabilistic modeling is that it encodes 
abductive, i.e. reverse reasoning, under conditions of multiple causation. After 
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presentation of the general features of the mentioned formalisms, the chapter 
presented bayesian networks in more detail, together with the systemic interpretation 
assigned to the calculus´ elements. Finally, a toy application has been presented, in 
which level transitory statements are derived from a bayesian network 
formulation. The toy application deals with contact choices in a network of three 
agents. Here a subjective expected utility approach which is adapted to consider 
homophily and reciprocity forms the agent model of the application. Recurring to 
Heider´s (1958) classical balance theory, decision distributions of a particular agent 
are derived for each of the possible balance states of a triad, thus instantiating level 
transitory statements.  
 
Chapter three 
 
Chapter three ("Simple Heuristics in Complex Networks") has been concerned with a 
multi-agent simulation study about social influence. It is connected to the previous 
chapters by presenting an application of the discussed methodology in the fields of 
sociology and social psychology. 
    The central topic of the chapter was the formation of attribute structures in social 
networks over time due to processes of social influence. Social influence has been 
conceptualized as result of cognitive activity on the side of the receiving agent in the 
influence relation. More precisely, the chapter dealt with the interaction of 
elaborateness (or effort) of agent cognition and the clustering structure of the agents´ 
social network. 
    Cognitive processing of social influence has been modeled as a decision process 
which is based on social cues. Given this framework, cognitive effort is identified with 
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the amount of information which is considered during the decision process. 
Obviously, it may be possible that some agent may not use all the information which 
is available in her social environment, i.e. her local social network. This is important 
since such a situation implies that an agent would depart from perfect rationality. 
Choice of information sources may depend on some characteristic like the expected 
validity of information, a quantity which can be directly linked to the status of the 
agent in focus. We (that means my co-author and me) considered several strategies 
of contact selection and information integration, as suggested by work on heuristic 
decision making, each associated with a different amount of cognitive effort needed. 
It should be noted, that we purposively abstained from considering highly complex 
models of cognition, since we believe that simplistic modeling yields more rigorous 
and often more realistic analyses. 
    In particular, we distinguished a contact and an information integration phase in 
the employed decision models. Two different rules have been implemented for the 
contact phase: (1) the ALL-rule, where all locally available information is considered, 
regardless of the status of the agents who act as information source. (2) the better 
equal (BE) -rule, where only those agents are contacted, who have at least the same 
status as the contacting agent. For integration of collected information four different 
rules have been implemented: (1) the weighted additive model (WADD), which 
computes a weighted sum over the values of the feasible decision alternatives, the 
weight being the respective information sources´ status. The decision alternative with 
the maximum sum is then chosen. (2) the unit weight model (UWM) which proceeds 
in analogy to the WADD rule, with the difference that status remains unconsidered in 
the decision process. (3) the follow the leader (FTL) rule, which simply imitates the 
decision of the neighboring agent with the highest status. (4) the minimalist (MIN) 
rule, which randomly chooses one of the contacted agents for imitation. 
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    The second important aspect that the simulation study focused on has been the 
clustering structure of the agents´ social network. More specifically, we focused on 
examining if the influence process going on in the interaction network is sensitive to 
the network´s clustering structure. Prior studies (c.f. Latané and L'Herrou 1996) have 
shown that clustering is a key variable for the persistence of minority factions, 
because agents who are embedded in highly cohesive clusters are effectively 
shielded against outside influences by their fellow cluster members. 
    In order to examine possible interaction between the decision strategies employed 
by the agents and the networks clustering structure, we attempted to vary the latter 
systematically. Therefore we decided to employ a stochastic network model which 
allows explicit variation of clustering. The so called small world model is such a 
network model. It starts by invoking a regular ring lattice in which each agent is 
connected to a certain number of neighbors on each side. Then randomly picked 
agents are reconnected to another randomly picked agent with a certain probability. 
The concept behind this procedure is the following. Regular lattices have the feature 
of high local clustering. An increasing probability of "rewiring" the regular network 
leads to first connecting and then breaking the highly clustered network. In our 
simulation study, we considered the three following configurations: (1)  "cyclic 
regular" and not rewired networks, which are highly clustered, (2) "small world"-
networks, which are rewired with a probability p=0.1 and represent a structure of 
interconnected clusters and (3) "random regular" networks which are rewired with a 
probability p=1.0 and which contain no regularity other than an equal expected 
number of neighbors. 
 
Repeated simulations which aimed to explore systematically the model´s parameter 
space revealed very interesting results. I will only sketch the most important results at 
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this point, a much more detailed treatment can be found in the respective chapter. As 
it turned out, the influence process settled quickly and both clustering structure and 
agents' contact strategies led to substantial differences in terms of outcomes of the 
process. In general, unanimity was unlikely and highly clustered networks increased 
the size of the minority factions , which is in coherence to the results of Latané & 
L'Herrou (1996). However, when agents chose only higher status neighbors as 
information sources, the size of the minorities decreased. In this case the distribution 
of equilibrium factions became furthermore independent from the clustering structure 
of the communication network. Taken together our results showed that there is a 
substantial impact of the employed decision strategy on the group decision to be 
made. So does the consideration of high status for information search lead to a 
situation in which the formation of majorities becomes most probable, even if the 
communication network is clustered into cohesive subgroups. Furthermore we found 
that interaction of agent cognition and communication structure is a central aspect for 
the course of social processes. Another significant (but of course expected) result is 
that even simplistic models of agent cognition can result in rich collective behavior. It 
may therefore not be necessary to assume agents with sophisticated mental 
capabilities in order to explain complex social processes. In addition to conducting a 
systematic parameter study we also employed our modeling framework in a case 
study based on empirical data. Our case data has been about work interaction in an 
American lawfirm, similar to the example given in the introduction of the dissertation. 
Using our simulation model, we computed equilibrium distributions for an 
interaction process about changing organizational policies. We inferred different 
possible outcomes of the process, where persistence of the minority position was 
ultimately governed by the decision strategy employed. 
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Chapter four 
 
Chapter four ("Evaluating Social Influence Relations: an Item-Response-Modeling 
Approach") aimed at providing well founded measurement instruments in order to 
calibrate simulation models or to conduct closed-network studies in general. In doing 
so, it completes the topical arch of this dissertation, which ranges from philosophy 
and methodology to simulation modeling and measurement. Theoretical basis of the 
chapter has been the cognitive approach to social influence which has been 
advocated previously. This means that the instruments focused on measuring 
perceptions of the potential of contact persons to exercise social influence. Without 
exclusively relating to a model of heuristic decision making, the 
chapter elaborated Turner´s (2005) theory of power with regard to cognitive 
processing of social influence. While being somewhat sloppy in formulation, Turner´s 
approach has the merit of joining important traditions in the study of social power. It 
proposes three processes (or, as I like to call them, dimensions) of social influence, 
which are persuasion, authority and coercion. The assumptions about persuasion 
stemmed from Turner´s self-categorization theory (cf. Turner 1991). Persuasion is 
defined as being the effect of a process of social reality validation, which means that 
given a person does not have full control over a given task, she will try to validate her 
conception of the task by means of social interaction. Put in different terms, this 
means that absence of control over some task is a prerequisite for being persuaded. 
A further assumption is that communication partners, which are perceived as similar 
will have a stronger persuasive impact, since those are expected to convey useful 
information. Authority is defined in analogy to Weber´s (1984) classical concept of  
legitimate order, namely by a person´s degree of conviction that it is right that she is 
controlled by another person in certain matters. Coercion finally captures the concept 
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that a person may comply to another person, because she is forced to do so since 
the other person controls the resources she needs. 
 
Following the considerations summarized above, questionnaire items were 
presented, which had been developed as basis for a quantitative measurement 
instrument. The items on persuasion were intended to reflect perceived similarity, 
with emphasis on perceived helpfulness of a contact person for own problem coping, 
while operationalization of control of the task has been left open because of its 
situational specialty. The item set on authority were intended to capture the 
perception of rational and accepted authority of a contact person. Coercion was 
meant to be operationalized by items focusing on some contact person´s use of 
coercive means in everyday interaction. During the pretest 58 items in total had been 
presented to the pretest sample consisting of social science university students. In 
the end, 11 items from this pool had been selected for the final scales and were 
presented to a calibration sample also consisting of university students. All responses 
were allowed to range on a five-point agreement scale. 
    After discussion of theory and item wording, the mathematical apparatus of the 
instruments had been presented. Measurement models came from the class of item-
response-theory models. Item response theory is a stochastic measurement theory 
which estimates strength of both person related unobserved attributes and item set 
related difficulty of questions from the response patterns provided. In particular, the 
binary-response Rasch-model and the polytomous response Partial-Credit- and 
Rating-Scale-models have been presented. The latter two have been employed for 
the scales developed and the results of calibration have been presented in the 
chapter. The choice of the employed measurement model had been based on 
comparison of the models´ fit to the respective item set´s responses. 
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Since the instruments had been developed and calibrated in a survey setting but 
were intended to be applied in a closed network setting, chapter four also presented 
a closed network study in which these instruments were applied. Data for the closed-
network study had been collected via an online-survey in a group of researches 
which was jointly applying for a DFG-research grant. The researchers were asked to 
complete a questionnaire in which they were encouraged to provide information 
about specific project-related attitudes, their pattern of communication in the group 
and finally their evaluation of their respective communication partners in the group, 
using the proposed measurement instruments. From the gathered data, scale values 
had been inferred and were used to reconstruct  networks of persuasion-, authority- 
and coercion-relations in the group. These networks were then employed to 
formulate network autocorrelation models (NACM), a special regression model which 
controlled for these network relations while explaining a particular attitude variable 
measured during data collection. In other words, it has been tested if knowledge of 
the inferred influence networks yields a better explanation of attitude variables. It had 
been demonstrated that inclusion of a network term always led to better performance 
of the regression model, as compared to a baseline model without any network 
information. However, only for one instrument prediction has been superior to the 
case where only the network of acquaintances, but not the perceptions of potential 
influences have been integrated. This has been the persuasion-network. However it 
has been stated that this does not lead to the conclusion that the other measurement 
instruments have no validity, since the data dealt only with the small and special case 
of a group of researchers, where both strong authority and openly coercive behavior 
seem less likely than in other contexts. 
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Achievements of the dissertation 
 
After presenting a summary of the individual chapters it is now time to discuss the 
achievements made in this dissertation. The first chapter yielded important results in 
the field of philosophy of the social sciences, since it presents a systematic and 
coherent approach to modeling of social systems and inference of level transitory 
relations. The claim of importance is underlined by the fact that it relates to present 
discussions in social theory, namely the topics of bridge hypotheses, reduction and 
emergence and relation of social science and philosophy of mind. The second 
chapter contributes to scientific progress in terms that it combines a thoroughly 
elaborated philosophical approach with computational modeling methodologies and 
furthermore presents an actual application of the claims made. It therefore relates to 
actual methodology in the social sciences. The third chapter yielded interdisciplinary 
progress by combining the fields of social theory, computational modeling and 
cognitive science. Especially the analysis of the social effects of assumptions on 
agent cognition and their interaction with communication structures is noteworthy. 
With introduction of heuristic decision making to models of social influence, a recent 
concept of bounded rationality has been successfully applied. Chapter four 
contributed to progress in the social sciences by introducing parametric item 
response measurement to the study of social networks and elaborating social-
psychological theory on social influence. A further achievement concerns the use of 
methods from spatial statistics to check the applicability of survey instruments in 
closed network settings. Taken together, the dissertation can be considered to be a 
very productive enterprize, at least in the eyes of the author and maybe also in the 
eyes of my supervisors. 
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Outlook 
 
Although this dissertation has been a productive enterprize, it is certainly not the 
sorcerer´s stone. Work on the presented topics of course revealed limitations of the 
approaches considered and suggested both alternative approaches and follow up 
research. As in the previous section on the achievements made, I will discuss the 
implications of the individual chapters. 
    Dealing with the ontological foundations of level transitory modeling, chapter one 
has implications for modeling methodology and development of social theory. 
Perhaps the most important implication is that philosophical considerations should be 
integrated to a larger extend into actual theorizing and modeling. Although scientific 
work seems to be well defined in terms of standards and practices of a discipline, 
these are not as self-evident as it seems. On the contrary, only minor changes of the 
content of such elementary concepts as agency or the introduction of new modes of 
inference such as probability theory may lead to a completely different view on the 
world. Consideration of these foundations should therefore be more explicitly 
integrated into scientific work. Model structures should be defendable by coherent 
argument and not only by reference to a paradigm, which is often the case. 
    Of course, the methodology discussed in the first two chapters needs further 
development. With regard to the ontological part, it would be desirable to put it on 
firmer grounds, extending the subjectivist foundations to theory which is aligned to 
results in the special sciences. This might well be possible, especially since 
applicability has been an explicit intent of the project. With regard to productive 
application, further research on the implications of formalisms is necessary. A 
limitation of the probabilistic approach employed is, that it is very demanding in terms 
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computation. However, it promises the integration of theoretical and statistical 
inference and therefore seems most promising. 
    The applied work presented in chapters three and four implies promising 
developments in the fields of agent cognition and social influence. Its primary 
objective has been to formulate a causally plausible model of social 
interdependence, which is an alternative to the frequently used rational choice 
assumption. Chapter three also implies empirical research on the interaction of 
agents decision behavior and organizational structure, variables that have shown to 
be important predictors of collective behavior. For this objective, instruments like the 
one presented in chapter four may be used. Here, future research may deepen our 
understanding of how to validate measurement instruments in structured, systemic 
settings. 
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